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Article

The Fourth Amendment Implications of
“U.S. Imitation Judges”
Mary Holper†
INTRODUCTION
John Oliver, in a recent episode entitled “Immigration
Courts,” shone a spotlight on the numerous problems with how
U.S. immigration courts operate.1 He refuted a general misunderstanding that immigration courts sit in the judicial branch of
government, rendering critical adjudicative decisions about deportation, and explained that they actually are Executive
Branch employees.2 The boss of immigration judges is the attorney general of the United States, who works for the president.3
The prosecutor who argues to detain and deport the noncitizen
also works for the president, as an employee of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).4 The person who jailed the detainee in the first place is yet another DHS employee.5
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for the helpful comments from Daniel Kanstroom, Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan, Rachel Rosenbloom, Phil Torrey, Jennifer Klein, Timothy Watkins, Bob
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and Ryan Williams. I also would like to thank Andres Santamaria for his research assistance, and Dean Vincent Rougeau for research funding.
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1. Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO),
YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA
[https://perma.cc/L3W8-EFHF].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Scholars, immigration judges, attorneys, and congressional
committees have been calling for a truly independent immigration adjudication system for decades,6 critiquing a system in
6. See, e.g., Hearing on Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. & Immigration of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. (Statement of Judge A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, National Association of Immigration Judges) (2018) [hereinafter Statement], https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc04-18-18%20Tabaddor%
20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF4H-JZKF] (discussing the inconsistencies
of having a judicial court in a law enforcement department); Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 72–73, 85
(2002) (statement of Dana Marks Keener, President, National Association of
Immigration Judges), https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg86931/
pdf/CHRG-107shrg86931.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRS7-5U66] (recommending
the adoption of a 1997 proposal to fix the problems of immigration courts); U.S.
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRATION POLICY (1997), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED424310.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GUS7-YAVL] (making recommendations to Congress on how
to reform the immigration system); SEC’Y OF LABOR’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 81–82 (mimeo. 1940);
AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2010), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/
coi_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E3P-QX4H]
(proposing solutions to the problems with immigration courts); APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION
COURTS 35 (2009), https://www.appleseednetwork.org/uploads/1/2/4/6/
124678621/assembly_line_injustice-_blueprint_to_reform_americas_
immigration_courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT6K-TT4E] (advocating for impartial immigration judges); JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE:
DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 12–16
(2011) (outlining the structure of immigration courts); Lawrence H. Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 433, 439 (1983) (describing 1981 report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, appointed in 1978, which proposed creation of an Article I immigration
court); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 372–75 (2006) [hereinafter Legomsky, War on Independence] (discussing the history of immigration judges); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1644–51 (2010) [Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication] (detailing the criticisms of
immigration courts); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress
Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL.
3, 3–4, 10–11 (2008) [hereinafter Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority] (explaining
that many problems remain unsolved with respect to immigration courts); Dana
Leigh Marks, Still a Legal Cinderella? Why the Immigration Courts Remain an
Ill-Treated Stepchild Today, 59 FED. LAW. 25, 29 (2012) [hereinafter Leigh
Marks, Still a Legal Cinderella] (showing how immigration courts are important for all lawyers to understand); Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court
for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644, 644–45
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which some judges describe themselves as “U.S. imitation
judges.”7 This Article examines the lack of truly independent immigration judges (IJs) through the lens of the Fourth Amendment, which applies when a noncitizen is arrested for deportation.8 In 1975, the Supreme Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh9 that
to continue detention after an initial arrest in the criminal context, the detached judgment of a neutral judge is necessary; a
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause is insufficient to protect
the important Fourth Amendment rights to be free from an unreasonable seizure.10 In contrast, in the immigration detention
context, no such neutral judge has any role in the process. Every
person who authorizes a noncitizen’s arrest and detention works
for a law enforcement agency, causing one to wonder who exactly
is exercising independent judgment over decisions concerning
noncitizens’ physical freedom.

(1981) (explaining the inefficiencies with dependence on the Immigration and
Naturalization Service); Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Laws: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1956) (arguing that the procedures of justified deportation warrant scrutiny); M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review—A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1525, 1562 (1997) (proposing an Article I court for immigration law); Denise Noonan Slavin & Dorothy Harbeck, A View from the Bench by the National
Association of Immigration Judges, 63 FED. LAW. 67, 68 (2016) (explaining how
a growing caseload, coupled with inconsistent obligations, affects immigration
courts); Denise Noonan Slavin & Dana Leigh Marks, Conflicting Roles of Immigration Judges: Do You Want Your Case Heard by a “Government Attorney” or
by a “Judge”?, 16 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1785, 1787 (2011) (demonstrating
the complexities of immigration courts); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7 (1980) (examining the expanded role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service); Harry
N. Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 151 (1958) (“[W]here the consul
denies, or refuses to issue, a visa, he is a law unto himself, and his action is final
and cannot be reviewed by any other administrative authority.”); Note, The Special Inquiry Officer in Deportation Proceedings, 42 VA. L. REV. 803, 818–25
(1956) (describing the process of discretionary relief); Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, AILA Renews Call for an Independent Immigration
Court (May 27, 2003) (“AILA urges the creation of an independent immigration
court system . . . .”).
7. Slavin & Harbeck, supra note 6, at 70 (“As one of our colleagues put it,
we often feel that we are ‘U.S. imitation judges.’”).
8. See infra Part II.
9. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
10. Id. at 114.
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This Article builds off of prior scholarship examining the
Fourth Amendment’s application in the immigration context, introducing a further problem: immigration adjudicators’ lack of
independence. Christopher Lasch exposed the Fourth Amendment violations inherent in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer practices,11 which spurred successful
Fourth Amendment litigation when local governments attempted to hold persons without probable cause pursuant to ICE
detainers.12 Following the successful detainer litigation, Michael
Kagan described the practice of warrantless arrests for deportation without a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral decision-maker as “[i]mmigration [l]aw’s [l]ooming Fourth Amendment [p]roblem.”13 Kagan assumed the neutrality of
immigration judges in his article, focusing instead on the length
of time before noncitizens receive such review of DHS’s detention
decisions.14 In a separate article, I have critiqued the detentions
pursuant to the “shadow” procedures of expedited and administrative removal as a further Fourth Amendment violation, as
only DHS officers sign off on detention as part of these procedures.15 Because the decision-makers in shadow deportations
are DHS actors, not immigration judges, in that piece I do not

11. Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority
to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 186–93 (2008)
(outlining procedural avenues to change ICE issues); Christopher N. Lasch, Litigating Immigration Detainer Issues, in IMMIGRATION LAW FOR THE COLORADO
PRACTITIONER 34-1 (1st ed., 2011) (pointing out how varying interpretations
and use of Form I-247 could implicate constitutional safeguards such as probably cause); Christopher N. Lasch, The Faulty Legal Arguments Behind Immigration Detainers, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR.: PERSPECTIVES
SERIES, Dec. 2013, at 2, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/research/lasch_on_detainers.pdf [https://perma.cc/J27N-EH5G]
(encouraging jurisdictions to adopt different detainer policies).
12. See infra Part II.
13. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 126 (2015).
14. Id. In a recent article, I also propose prompt probable cause hearings
before immigration judges, but only for post-entry social control deportations.
See Mary Holper, Promptly Proving the Need To Detain for Post-Entry Social
Control Deportation, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 238 (2018). In this article I only
briefly question immigration judges’ neutrality without fully exploring the
Fourth Amendment implications of their lack of neutrality. Id.
15. Mary Holper, The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations, 86
U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 932–37 (2018).
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fully explore the immigration adjudication system’s lack of a
truly neutral judge.16
In this Article, I propose that federal magistrate judges
make such a probable cause finding in order to continue pretrial
detention for deportation.17 This proposal resolves the Fourth
Amendment violations that occur when the only supposedly
“neutral” judge who authorizes the jailing of a human being is
regularly critiqued as not so “neutral.”18 While others have effectively argued that the entire immigration adjudication system
needs a judge who is untethered from a law enforcement
agency,19 in this Article, I focus only on the initial decision to
continue pretrial detention, as this is where, in the criminal pretrial context, the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause hearing
requirement attaches.
The need for a neutral decision-maker in immigration detention decisions has never been more important. The Trump
administration has promoted an unabashedly anti-immigrant
agenda, resolving to detain and deport as many immigration violators as possible20 and promising to end the “catch and release”
program that candidate Trump referred to as a “massive amnesty.”21 The administration has kept its promises, going so far
as announcing a “zero tolerance” policy of taking children away
from asylum-seekers who illegally cross the U.S. border to deter

16. See id. at 940–43.
17. See infra Part I.A.1.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 6, at 7; Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 385.
20. See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,
Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Border
Security Executive Order], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/
01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement
-improvements [https://perma.cc/8KCB-UGTK] (increasing detention powers);
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Implementing President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies
(Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Border Security Implementation Memo], https://
www.dhs.gov/publication/implementing-presidents-border-security-and
-immigration-enforcement-improvement-policies [https://perma.cc/W7RQ
-N5DJ] (putting the executive order into practice).
21. Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Luedecke Arena in Austin, Texas (Aug.
23, 2016).
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future border-crossers.22 Only after massive national and international outcry did President Trump reverse the policy.23 In fiscal year 2017, the ICE agency within DHS jailed a daily average
of nearly 40,500 people.24 By May 2019, reports show a staggering 52,000 people in ICE detention.25 The ICE Enforcement and
Removal Operations made a total of 143,470 arrests in FY 2017,
a thirty percent rise from FY 2016.26 In FY 2018 ICE increased
that arrest number by eleven percent, arresting 158,581 people.27
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions in 2017 announced
that the administration “will secure this border and bring the
full weight of both the immigration courts and federal criminal
enforcement to combat this attack on our national security and

22. See Eli Rosenberg, Senator Asks FBI for Perjury Investigation of
Kirstjen Nielson over Family Separation Statements, WASH. POST (Jan. 18,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/18/senator-asks-fbi
-perjury-investigation-kirstjen-nielsen-over-family-separation-statements/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.03495885e6a0 [https://perma.cc/D4SB-QAB5] (discussing recently leaked DHS Memo regarding family separation policy with link
to memo).
23. See John Wagner et al., Trump Reverses Course, Signs Order Ending
His Policy of Separating Families at the Border, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gop-leaders-voice-hope-that-bill
-addressing-family-separations-will-pass-thursday/2018/06/20/cc79db9a-7480
-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.ddaaebcc4d25 [https://perma.cc/GW97-UDCC] (referring to the “[i]nternational
condemnation of the Trump administration policy” as one source of the change
in policy).
24. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. & DET. WATCH NETWORK, ICE LIES:
PUBLIC DECEPTION, PRIVATE PROFIT 2 (2018), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/
default/files/content-type/research-item/documents/2018-02/IcLies_DWN_
NIJC_Feb2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP5T-FFR9].
25. Hamed Aleaziz, More than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained by
ICE, an Apparent All-Time High, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2019), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants
-border [https://perma.cc/9Z9Q-5RCM].
26. Kristen Bialik, ICE Arrests Went Up in 2017, with Biggest Increases in
Florida, Northern Texas, Oklahoma, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/08/ice-arrests-went-up-in-2017-with
-biggest-increases-in-florida-northern-texas-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/W576
-5SJ4].
27. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS 2 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/22EJ-2UET].
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sovereignty.”28 As part of this agenda, Sessions made key decisions to undermine judges’ independence,29 causing one administrative law scholar to note that “[p]residential administration
has finally penetrated agency adjudications.”30 Acting Attorney
General Matthew Whitaker continued where Sessions left off,
publicly criticizing Central American asylum-seekers as “lawbreakers” with “meritless claims” who “take advantage of loopholes that lead to their release into the United States.”31 Attorney General William Barr also has suffered criticism for
penalizing asylum-seekers with mandatory detention, taking
away discretion from immigration judges.32 Former Chairman of
the Board of Immigration Appeals, Paul Wickham Schmidt, has
denounced a “concerted politically-based attack on migrants and
the independence of the Immigration Court system orchestrated
by restrictionist groups outside of government who use unscrupulous and willing senior officials like Barr, and Sessions before
him, as operatives.”33 One is correct to question how much pres-

28. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice’s Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions
-announces-department-justice-s-renewed-commitment-criminal [https://
perma.cc/42CV-NUXY].
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J.
1, 34 (2018). Kim discusses both the legal and cultural constraints that have
kept the president from interfering with the adjudicative activities of executive
branch agencies, which, she writes, have ended in the Trump administration.
Id. at 12–16, 37.
31. Matthew Whitaker, Acting U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks on the Importance of a Lawful Immigration System (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/speech/acting-attorney-general-matthew-whitaker-delivers-remarks
-importance-lawful-immigration [https://perma.cc/N26D-YKPU].
32. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Carlson, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to
William Barr, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/ABALettertoAGBarrreMatterofM-S
-4-23-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4JP-8HPS] (critiquing Attorney General opinion in M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 590 (A.G. 2019), which removed immigration judges’
discretion in deciding bond for recently-arrived asylum-seekers, and stating,
“[w]e are also concerned that this decision is one more step in a series of recent
actions by the Department of Justice to remove discretion and restrict the authority of immigration judges.”).
33. Paul Wickham Schmidt, Barr Continues Restrictionist Assault on Immigration Courts: Intends To Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith &
Credit” to State Court Sentence Modifications — Another Disingenuous Request
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sure the “neutral” judges experience to execute the Trump administration’s anti-immigrant policies.34 We find ourselves in an
age where top-level Executive Branch actors have a stated goal
of detaining as many noncitizens as possible for deportation,35
and correspondingly pose an increasing threat to immigration
adjudicators’ independence. This Article explores the intersection of the two important topics of immigration adjudicators’ independence and detention.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview
of the relevant Fourth Amendment law, which requires a neutral
judge to review a law enforcement officer’s warrantless arrest in
order to continue detention and demonstrates why the Fourth
Amendment applies to immigration arrests, although nominally
“civil.” Thus, the lack of a truly neutral judge available to review
DHS arrest decisions exposes the entire immigration detention
system to a Fourth Amendment challenge. Part I also answers
doctrinal challenges to importing the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of neutral judge review into the immigration detention system. In Part II, the Article explains why the current immigration system lacks a truly neutral judge. Initially, the
structural lack of neutrality was a function of the historical
blending of immigration law’s prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions. Even once the functions were officially in separate
agencies as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
adjudicators still worked for the nation’s top law enforcement official. At that time, the Attorney General and Department of
Justice (DOJ) also began what has been called a “war on independence” on the adjudicators. Part II offers two examples of
For “Amicus Briefing!,” IMMIGRATIONCOURTSIDE.COM (May 30, 2019), https://
immigrationcourtside.com/2019/05/30/barr-continues-restrictionist-assault-on
-immigration-courts-intends-to-reverse-bia-precedents-giving-full-faith-credit
-to-state-court-sentence-modifications-another-disi/ [https://perma.cc/HUV9
-LNQV].
34. Hamed Aleaziz, Being an Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under
Trump, It Became Untenable, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign
-trump [https://perma.cc/HNJ2-NRZZ]; Bruce J. Einhorn, Jeff Sessions Wants
To Bribe Judges To Do His Bidding, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeff-sessions-wants-to-bribe-judges-to-do-his
-bidding/2018/04/05/fd4bdc48-390a-11e8-acd5-35eac230e514_story.html
[https://perma.cc/P4BK-V6ME].
35. See, e.g., Border Security Executive Order, supra note 20; Border Security Implementation Memo, supra note 20.
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how immigration judges’ independence has been further undermined by statutes and regulations that allow DHS prosecutors
to override immigration judges’ bond decisions. Part III provides
a proposal to remedy these systemic violations, which includes
federal magistrate judge review of any immigration arrest in order to continue detention.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND IMMIGRATION
ARRESTS
This Part discusses the Fourth Amendment’s applicability
to the immigration enforcement context, thus laying the foundation for why the lack of a truly neutral judge implicates the
Fourth Amendment rights of all who suffer immigration detention during removal proceedings.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL
JUDGE
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”36
In 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh,37 the Supreme Court required a
neutral judge to review a police officer’s decision to arrest a person without probable cause.38 A prosecutor’s decision to bring
criminal charges was insufficient to determine probable cause
because the Court did not think that “prosecutorial judgment
standing alone [met] the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”39 The Court wrote:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.40

Thus, to continue detention after initial arrest, the detached
judgment of a magistrate judge is necessary; the prosecutor’s
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
38. Id. at 114–19.
39. Id. at 117.
40. Id. at 112–13 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14
(1948)).
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finding of probable cause is insufficient to protect Fourth
Amendment rights.41 This Fourth Amendment rule applies to
“any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.”42
As compared to these strictures of the criminal justice system, immigration officers have the authority to arrest noncitizens without a warrant.43 If they obtain a warrant, it is an administrative arrest warrant, which was signed by an
immigration officer—the equivalent of the police.44
A warrantless arrest requires only that immigration officers
promptly bring the noncitizen before a different DHS officer to
be questioned regarding their right to be in the United States.45
Only later does an immigration judge become involved in the
process,46 and at no point in the process do the statute or regulations mandate automatic review by a neutral and detached
magistrate.47
1. The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Immigration
Arrests
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided the right to
have an immigration arrest reviewed for probable cause by a
neutral judge to continue pretrial detention. There is some commentary on this issue in dicta from the 1960 case United States
v. Abel.48 In Abel, the Court considered whether an arrest pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by immigration authorities, which did not require judicial involvement, should lead
41. See id.
42. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (2019); see also Holper,
supra note 15, at 963 (describing “regular” removal proceedings).
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b).
45. See id. § 287.3(a); see also id. § 287.3(d) (requiring a decision on whether
to charge and detain to be made within forty-eight hours unless there are “emergency or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a determination will
be made within an additional reasonable period of time”).
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229; see also infra Part II (demonstrating the immigration judge’s role in authorizing detention).
47. Federal circuit courts of appeals may review questions of law or constitutional questions on appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals of an order
of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Detention challenges may be raised in a habeas
corpus petition before the federal district court, although the court may not review discretionary decisions regarding custody. See id. § 1226(e); Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
48. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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to suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment.49
Declining to suppress the evidence, the Court stated, “[s]tatutes
authorizing administrative arrest to achieve detention pending
deportation proceedings have the sanction of time.”50 Yet, the
Court acknowledged that no litigant had raised that challenge
to arrest for deportation prior to the Abel case.51 The Court repeatedly stated that the petitioner had waived the issue by not
raising it in prior stages of the litigation, thus rendering its commentary on administrative arrests dicta.52 Also, at that time the
Court had not yet clarified that the Fourth Amendment applied
to civil and administrative searches.53 Nor had the Court decided
subsequent cases applying the Fourth Amendment to border patrol’s enforcement actions.54
In a 1993 case, Reno v. Flores, children in immigration custody raised the right to a probable cause hearing, framing the
issue as a Due Process protection, yet the Court’s holding does
not extend to adult detention.55 In Reno the Supreme Court re-

49. Id. at 230.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 233 (“The constitutional validity of this long-standing administrative arrest procedure in deportation cases has never been directly challenged in reported litigation. . . . This Court seems never expressly to have directed its attention to the particular question of the constitutional validity of
administrative deportation warrants. It has frequently, however, upheld administrative deportation proceedings shown by the Court’s opinion to have been
begun by arrests pursuant to such warrants.”).
52. See id. at 230 (“The claim that the administrative warrant by which
petitioner was arrested was invalid, because it did not satisfy the requirements
for ‘warrants’ under the Fourth Amendment, is not entitled to our consideration
in the circumstances before us. It was not made below; indeed, it was expressly
disavowed.”); id. (stating that the petition “did not challenge the exercise of [the
warrant] authority below, but expressly acknowledged its validity”); id. at 231
(“At no time did petitioner question the legality of the administrative arrest
procedure either as unauthorized or unconstitutional. Such challenges were, to
repeat, disclaimed.”); id. at 232 (“Affirmative acceptance of what is now sought
to be questioned could not be plainer.”).
53. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 134 (discussing Camara v. Municipal
Court, 386 U.S. 523, 532 (1967), in which the Court held in 1967 that the Fourth
Amendment applies to civil and administrative searches).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973); see also Holper, supra note 15, at 944 (discussing Fourth Amendment’s applicability in border patrol cases).
55. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
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versed the Ninth Circuit’s mandate that juveniles in Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) custody receive Gerstein
probable cause hearings.56 A Ninth Circuit panel concluded that
Gerstein did not apply to deportation proceedings and that the
Gerstein Court itself stressed that its holding was not readily
transferrable to civil proceedings.57 The panel also followed the
dicta in Abel, writing that although “[it was] professing not to
reach the issue of whether an INS arrest warrant was invalid
because it failed to comply with the fourth amendment’s requirements for warrants, the Court nonetheless devoted five pages to
rejecting petitioner’s claim.”58 An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the children’s fundamental liberty
interest required that “the decision to detain be made only in
conjunction with a neutral and detached determination of necessity.”59 The Supreme Court held that there was no fundamental
liberty interest at stake, since the case dealt with INS custody of
children, who are “always in some form of custody.”60 Thus,
“shackles, chains, or barred cells” were not at issue, as would be
the case in adult immigration detention.61 The Court dedicated
very little of its decision to the procedural due process claim that
the children should have their detention promptly reviewed for
probable cause by a neutral judge. Rather, the Court held that
the juveniles were given ample procedures under the regulations.62 Nowhere in the majority opinion is Gerstein even mentioned.63 Because the Flores Court took great pains to ensure
56. Id.
57. Flores ex rel. Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese (Flores I ), 913 F.2d 1315,
1335–37 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975)).
The Court remanded to the district court to determine whether such a hearing
was appropriate under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See id. at 1337
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)).
58. Id. at 1337 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 233 (1960)).
59. Flores ex rel. Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese (Flores II ), 942 F.2d 1352,
1364–65 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
60. Id. at 1383 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
61. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.
62. Id. at 307–08.
63. This is unlike the panel decision and the en banc decisions, which, between the majority opinions and the concurring and dissenting opinions, yielded
much discussion about the applicability of Gerstein or whether a prompt probable cause hearing should be afforded to the juveniles under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. See Flores II, 942 F.2d at 1364–65 (en banc opinion addressing Gerstein issue); Flores I, 913 F.2d at 1335–37 (panel opinion discussion of
applicability of Gerstein).
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that it was not deciding about “shackles, chains, or barred cells,”
the issue of whether adults in immigration detention can seek a
Gerstein-style hearing was not resolved.64
Starting in the 1970s, when the Fourth Amendment challenges involved issues other than the right to have one’s arrest
reviewed for probable cause, the Court repeatedly applied the
Fourth Amendment to immigration officers’ enforcement actions.65 To be sure, the Court’s holdings have suffered critique
for watering down the strictures of the Fourth Amendment in
the context of immigration enforcement, for example, that
they’ve permitted racial profiling and set a low bar for noncitizens to “consent” to searches.66 Yet, this critique does not change

64. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 151–52. Other courts have not recognized
a Fourth Amendment right to a neutral detached magistrate to review detention for probable cause in the immigration context. See, e.g., Salgado v. Scannel,
561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding warrantless arrest legal pursuant
to statute and thus subsequent statement taken following arrest should not be
suppressed); cf. United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 399–400 (1st Cir.
2001) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires a
prompt probable cause hearing, does not protect detainees arrested for deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)). Some have followed the dicta in Abel. See, e.g.,
Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“While the Supreme Court declined to pass upon a similar argument in Abel, . . . some pertinent observations there were nonetheless made . . . the court did refer to its
frequent upholding of administrative deportation proceedings shown to have
commenced by arrests made pursuant to such warrants.”). Others have assumed, without much analysis, that an immigration officer’s review of the
charges is the equivalent to prompt review of detention by a magistrate judge.
See, e.g., Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (mistakenly reasoning that a “special inquiry officer” signed off on the arrest warrant and that
“[s]pecial inquiry officers have judicial authority . . . and therefore correspond
to the committing magistrate in a criminal proceeding”); Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The phrase
‘has reason to believe’ has been equated with the constitutional requirement of
probable cause.”); Min-Shey Hung v. United States, 617 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir.
1980); United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1035 (1975); Au Yi Lau v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d
217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
65. See, e.g., United States. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 884
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2011); Jennifer M. Chacón, Border
Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010);
Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling Became the Law of the Land: United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1024–25 (2010).
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the simple fact that the Fourth Amendment does apply.67 The
applicability of the Fourth Amendment when an ICE officer arrests a noncitizen for deportation is one of the few positive outcomes of the 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,68 where the
Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule, except when immigration officers committed egregious violations of the noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights.69 Because the Lopez-Mendoza
decision dealt only with the remedy of evidentiary exclusion, it
implicitly recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to
such an arrest,70 as subsequent courts have clarified.71 However,
the Lopez-Mendoza Court’s refusal to apply one of the most recognized remedies to Fourth Amendment violations to deportation cases left immigration scholars and advocates losing faith
in the Fourth Amendment.72
In 1990, the Court gave immigration law scholars and advocates more reason to lose faith in the Fourth Amendment.73 In
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,74 the Court held that a Mexican citizen could not claim suppression as a remedy for a Fourth
Amendment violation when U.S. federal agents searched his
properties in Mexico after he had been arrested in Mexico and
67. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 (“The Fourth Amendment applies
to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”).
68. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). The Court also suggested it might entertain
Fourth Amendment challenges should the violations become “widespread.” Id.
at 1050.
69. Id. at 1050–51.
70. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 147–48; M. Isabel Medina, Ruminations
on the Fourth Amendment: Case Law, Commentary, and the Word “Citizen,” 11
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 189, 196 (2008) (“The Lopez-Mendoza opinion accepted
without question the principle that the Fourth Amendment applied to undocumented persons in a criminal proceeding.”).
71. See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“To hold otherwise would give no effect to the language used by the Supreme
Court in Lopez-Mendoza expressing concern over fundamentally unfair methods
of obtaining evidence and would ignore the fact that eight justices in LopezMendoza seem to have agreed that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings in some form.”); Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 694 F.3d
259, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2012); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.
2006); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).
72. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights after INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999 (1992).
73. See id.
74. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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extradited to the United States for prosecution.75 The Court examined the history of the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the
people” and found that unlike other amendments (such as the
Fifth Amendment that applies to “persons” and the Sixth
Amendment that applies to the “accused”), the Fourth Amendment only applies to U.S. citizens or those with voluntary substantial connections to the political community of the U.S.76 Because he had not established voluntary “substantial connections”
to the U.S., Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez could not claim Fourth
Amendment rights.77 In dicta, the Court wrote that the Fourth
Amendment should apply to noncitizens who are illegally in the
U.S.78 This dicta suggests that the thousands of noncitizens who
are lawfully in the U.S., either as permanent residents or holders of less permanent immigration statuses, and yet are deportable, have a voluntary substantial connection to the political
community of the U.S. such that they can claim Fourth Amendment protections. Even those who have never been admitted but

75. Id. at 274–75.
76. Id. at 265–67.
77. Id. at 271, 274–75.
78. Id. at 272–73 (reasoning that “[t]he illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza
were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations,” which distinguished their cases from that of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, who “had no voluntary connections with this country that might place
him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”). Courts have disagreed about
whether the plurality opinion’s discussion with respect to whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to “illegal aliens” is dicta or binding precedent, since Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote “[i]f the search had occurred in a
residence within the United States, I have little doubt that the full protections
of the Fourth Amendment would apply.” Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-411(KC), 2005 WL 388589,
at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (finding that a border crossing-card holder had
Fourth Amendment rights and stating that “[t]he definition of ‘the people’ advanced in Verdugo-Urquidez is therefore considered as persuasive authority to
the extent it applies to resolution of the present motion for summary judgment.”), aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Guttierez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“It is also noteworthy that a majority of the justices did not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s [VerdugoUrquidez] opinion, particularly with respect to his discussion and analysis regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to illegal aliens”) rev’d
on other grounds by United States v. Guttierez, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999).
But see United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261 (D. Utah
2003) (“This court is not at liberty to second-guess Justice Kennedy’s direct
statement that he was joining the Court’s opinion.”).
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who have developed community ties to the U.S. should be protected under this analysis.79
In 2012, litigation challenging ICE detainers shed new light
on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to immigration
arrests.80 The ICE detainer is a request to state or local authorities to “[m]aintain custody” of a person for an additional fortyeight hours, plus weekends and holidays, “beyond the time when
the subject would have otherwise been released” from the state
or local custody.81 When local jails honored ICE’s request and
refused to release a person until ICE could take custody, those
held under detainers sued the state authorities, and in some
cases federal immigration authorities, for damages, arguing that

79. In Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney General of the United States of America,
the Third Circuit in 2018 reasoned that petitioners, who had entered the U.S.
unlawfully, satisfied the eligibility criteria for special immigrant juvenile status, but were awaiting availability of visas, developed the “substantial connections with this country,” such that precluding their challenge to expedited removal via habeas corpus violated the Suspension Clause. 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir.
2018) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271). The court reasoned: “This
is not to suggest that aliens must be accorded a formal statutory designation
and attendant benefits to lay claim to ‘substantial connections’ to invoke the
Suspension Clause . . . . We need not address here what minimum requirements
aliens must meet to lay claim to constitutional protections.” Id. at 170 n.13. Victor Romero argues, post-Verdugo-Urquidez, that the Fourth Amendment
“should be about creating a floor of rights, beneath which the United States
government may not fall.” Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment
Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: On Gutierrez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 62 (2000). He advocates
for the application of tort reform, in which a property owner owes the same duty
of care regardless of whether the person injured is an invitee, a licensee, or a
trespasser; in the same way, the U.S. government owes a duty to not unreasonably seize a lawful permanent resident, visa holder, or undocumented noncitizen. Id. at 79–82. Carolina Nuñez, discussing courts’ broad application of Verdugo-Urquidez, argues that courts should be evaluating membership and the
ensuing Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed to members of the U.S. community by looking not at proxies such as status, but at a more complex theory of
membership, such as community ties and mutuality of obligation. See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and
the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 137 (2011).
80. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 13; see also Holper, supra note 15.
81. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I-247 IMMIGRATION DETAINER FORM
(2019), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration
-detainer-form.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8XP-F8LY]; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)
(2019) (describing the length of time that ICE can detain a person who is not
otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency).
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this continued custody was a new “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and lacked probable cause.82 Because noncitizens enjoy the same rights as citizens when charged or held for
a crime,83 several courts responded to the unlawful seizure of a
noncitizen pursuant to an ICE detainer by analyzing their cases
under traditional Fourth Amendment principles.84
In fact, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to arrests pursuant to ICE
detainers was so obvious that “existing precedent . . . placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”85
82. See, e.g., Roy v. Cty. of L.A., No. CV 12-09012-AB (FFMx), 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27268, at *68–70 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018) (finding that Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department’s practice of holding inmates beyond their release dates
on the basis of immigration detainers “constitutes a new arrest under the
Fourth Amendment” and therefore violated detainees’ Fourth Amendment
rights because there was no judicial finding of probable cause); Parada v. Anoka
Cty., 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1243 (D. Minn. 2018) (finding local county honoring
ICE detainer violated detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights); Orellana v. Nobles
Cty., 230 F. Supp. 3d 934, 945 (D. Minn. 2017) (immigration detainee’s continued confinement after he would have been released on state charges of driving
under the influence, pursuant to ICE detainer, violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1001, 1004–
09 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (granting summary judgment to class of individuals targeted
by ICE detainers on their claim that ICE’s practice of issuing detainers without
obtaining an arrest warrant was prohibited by the INA and finding that the
warrantless arrest power of § 1357(a)(2) did not defeat their claim because “immigration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject of a detainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at
*10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also ICE Detainers and the Fourth Amendment:
What Do Recent Federal Court Decisions Mean?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2014_11_13_-_
ice_detainers_4th_am_limits.pdf [https://perma.cc/52NB-QQWS] [hereinafter
ICE Detainers] (collecting cases where holding a noncitizen under ICE detainer
was found to be a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes); Recent ICE Detainer Damages Cases, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www
.aclu.org/fact-sheet/recent-ice-detainer-damages-cases-2018) [https://perma.cc/
32WJ-QCMQ] [hereinafter Recent ICE Detainer Damages].
83. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (“[D]etention for
custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.”).
84. See Recent ICE Detainer Damages, supra note 82; ICE Detainers, supra
note 82, at 3–4.
85. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The court made this finding in response to ICE officials claiming qualified immunity, which would allow them to
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In addition to the detainer litigation, in 2012 the Supreme
Court in Arizona v. United States86 reiterated, albeit in dicta,
that the Fourth Amendment applies to arrests for immigration
enforcement purposes.87 The detainer cases and this most recent
language on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to immigration arrests thus have left the door open to the application
of a different Fourth Amendment right; namely, the right to review of detention by a neutral judge for probable cause, and release should that review not occur.88 It is thus time to reevaluate
the waived arguments from the 1960 Abel case or see how they
apply to the detention of adults, not children (as in the 1993 Flores case). Scholars and advocates could again find faith in the
Fourth Amendment.
Following the successful detainer litigation, Michael Kagan
has argued that “immigration law’s looming Fourth Amendment
problem” is the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing.89 Kagan
avoid liability for damages if they did not know that the Fourth Amendment
applied in this context. Id.; see also Parada, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1239 (same);
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying
the ICE officer qualified immunity), rev’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d
Cir. 2014).
86. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
87. The Court considered section 2(B) of the law, which required Arizona
officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status”
of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in
the United States.” Id. at 411 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B)
(West 2012)). The law also provided that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall
have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released.”
Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West 2012)). While the Court
found that other provisions of Arizona’s law were preempted by federal law,
section 2(B) was not, because nothing in federal law prohibited states from sharing information with ICE. Id. at 411–12. When challengers suggested that Arizona officials would delay the release of individuals pending information from
ICE, the Court stated, citing Fourth Amendment cases, that such holds would
be illegal. Id. at 413 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The Court also stated: “[it] is not a crime
for a removable alien to remain present in the United States . . . if the police
stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.” Id. at 407.
88. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 158–61; see also Holper, supra note 15, at
955–62 (proposing a probable cause hearing in front of an immigration judge);
Holper, supra note 14, at 267–87 (proposing a similar solution).
89. See generally Kagan, supra note 13 (explaining why immigration detentions are looking more and more like criminal detentions, and thus need probable cause).
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examines immigration law’s lack of such a hearing, which presents an overlap between Fourth and Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights, since guaranteeing such a hearing “is, in effect, a
requirement for a certain kind of process.”90 He proposes that
courts interpret the statute and regulations to provide a prompt
probable cause hearing before an immigration judge, in order to
avoid finding them unconstitutional.91 Drawing on the Supreme
Court cases examining immigration detention under a Due Process analysis, Kagan argues that, while most of those cases examined immigration detention at the “back end,” his proposal
would require courts to examine such detention at the “front
end.”92 In this Article, I diverge from Kagan in that I do not presume the neutrality of the immigration judge to satisfy the Gerstein requirement of neutrality.93
I believe that such a challenge to immigration detention can
be made by examining the problem exclusively through the lens
of the Fourth Amendment, instead of through the Due Process
Clause. Due process is flexible,94 and can vary depending on issues such as the detainee’s status, length of time in the U.S., and
the length of detention.95 The Fourth Amendment has its own

90. Id. at 129.
91. Id. at 129–30 (writing that “in Zadvydas, the Court opened the door to
‘constitutional limitations,’ not only due process claims” (quoting Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001))). Kagan wrote his article before the Supreme
Court’s 2018 Jennings decision, in which the Court struck down the Ninth Circuit’s use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine to mandate periodic bond
hearings with the burden of proof on the government. Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018). Holding that the Ninth Circuit’s reading was not a
plausible reading of the statutes authorizing detention, the Court remanded the
case back to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether prolonged detention under the
statutes violated the detainees’ due process rights. Id. at 851.
92. Kagan, supra note 13, at 128.
93. See infra Part II; see also Kagan, supra note 13, at 169 (recognizing that
“the reliance on immigration judges would not create a mechanism for a ‘judicial
determination of probable cause,’” yet reasoning that “immigration judges could
provide a significant measure of detachment from the ICE officers who arrest
people for immigration violations” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114
(1975))).
94. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
95. Compare Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36 (1982) (due process requires hearing for lawful permanent resident stopped at the border who seeks
to come back to the U.S.), with United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
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limitations that require a certain level of balancing as well,96 but
a Fourth Amendment inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of
the seizure, not the status of the person harmed by the seizure
or whether the proceedings that follow are punishment.97 It also
does not factor in the financial cost of the added procedures, as
the Due Process balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge does.98 In
this way, the Fourth Amendment provides one lens through
which to view an immigration system where individuals who are
detained for a variety of reasons, with a variety of statuses, and
with differing ties to the U.S. all suffer the same constitutional
harm—detention without review by a neutral judge.99 It can be
a forgotten Amendment when the question is preventive (as opposed to punitive) detention, as immigration detention is.100
It is also true that providing a Gerstein hearing before a
truly neutral judge is no panacea of rights for an immigration
detainee. Scholars have critiqued Gerstein’s lack of procedures
to protect against an erroneous finding of probable cause,101
U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (considering the due process claim of applicant for admission to the U.S. and stating, “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress
is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”).
96. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (“In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interests
of the individual, a process evident in our previous cases dealing with Border
Patrol traffic-checking operations.” (citations omitted)).
97. See Holper, supra note 15, at 930–32. Of course, the remedies available
for Fourth Amendment violations depend on the nature of the proceedings. See
id. at 955–69 (discussing various remedies for Fourth Amendment violations
occurring in expedited and administrative removal).
98. Id. at 960 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
99. See Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 706 (1997) (describing diverse population of “detainable
aliens” and recommending that INS, as a federal agency, use uniform procedures).
100. Beyond the scope of this Article is an examination of how courts came
to examine preventive detention schemes primarily through the lens of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable seizures. David Cole has briefly discussed the application of the Fourth Amendment to preventive detention such as immigration
detention. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected
Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 712 (2009) (“[W]hile preventive detention has most often been analyzed through the lens of due process, the Fourth
Amendment also imposes limits on the practice.”).
101. See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 27–28 (2006); George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit of
Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413, 421–23 (1986).
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since the Gerstein hearing is satisfied without the presence of
the detainee and the “full panoply of adversarial safeguards—
counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses.”102 The probable cause hearing may provide
only a “speed bump” in the criminal justice process, yet it requires prosecutors to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to
proceed.103 Also, providing a truly neutral decision-maker to justify a detainee’s continued pretrial detention, which often can
last years, provides the requisite neutral check on the thousands
of DHS detention decisions that are made each year. As scholars
document a growing number of wrongful deportations,104 including deportations of U.S. citizens,105 this probable cause “speed
bump” provides a critical procedural protection against wrongful
detentions.
a. Potential Limits on Applying a Gerstein Hearing to
Immigration Detention
There will certainly be critics that argue against a wholesale
importation of the Gerstein neutral judge review mandate into
the immigration context. Here, I address these doctrinal concerns.106
First, the plenary power of the political branches over immigration law would cause a court to balk at second-guessing Congress’s choice of procedures when it comes to enforcing immigration law. The Supreme Court has found detention to be a valid

102. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
103. Telephone Interview with Timothy Watkins, former federal defender,
now Dir.’s Leadership Program Resident, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts
(Sept. 7, 2018).
104. See Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes: Using Immigration
Enforcement Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769, 777–79 (2015)
(explaining how detention of U.S. citizens, terminations of removal, and summary removal errors are common); Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The
Dangers of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 384–87 (2014) (outlining
the ratio between stays of removal and successful cases); Rachel E. Rosenbloom,
Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and the Significance
of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 146–53 (2010) (explaining that a surge in
enforcement has likely made wrongful deportations more frequent).
105. Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011).
106. I recognize that there also will be practical, logistical concerns; these
are discussed in Part III.
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part of the deportation process,107 so, the argument goes, with
the plenary power to deport or exclude comes the plenary power
to detain during that process. In the foundational case for this
assertion, Wong Wing v. United States,108 the Court assumed
that the procedures would involve “temporary confinement” to
last just “while arrangements were being made for their deportation.”109 In fact, “the government could have deported Wong
Wing from Detroit to Canada in thirty minutes.”110 Notably, detention for thirty minutes would not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a person held for criminal trial today.111
In Wong Wing, the Chinese national was not being held for
deportation when he filed his case, but was confined to hard labor in the Detroit House of Correction;112 the Court held that this
confinement at hard labor was punishment, which could not be
imposed without a criminal trial.113 The Court justified detention as part of the deportation process by likening it to detention
as part of the criminal process:
We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part
of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion
or expulsion of aliens would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel
would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the
inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being
made for their deportation. Detention is a usual feature of every case

107. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (“[T]his Court has
recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid
aspect of the deportation process. As we said more than a century ago, deportation proceedings ‘would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody
pending the inquiry into their true character.’” (quoting Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896))); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952)
(“Detention is necessarily part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens
arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States
during the pendency of deportation proceedings.”).
108. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228.
109. Id. at 235.
110. Gerald L. Neuman, Wong Wing v. United States: The Bill of Rights Protects Illegal Aliens, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 31, 36 (2005).
111. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1991) (interpreting prompt probable cause hearing mandated under the Fourth Amendment to occur within forty-eight hours).
112. Neuman, supra note 110, at 35–36. While his case was on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the circuit court had admitted Wong Wing to bail pending appeal. Id. at 35.
113. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237.
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of arrest on a criminal charge, even when an innocent person is wrongfully accused; but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense.114

If an arrest on a criminal charge necessarily involves detention,115 and subsequent case law mandated such detention to be
reviewed by a neutral judge for probable cause,116 then shouldn’t
Wong Wing stand for this same proposition in the immigration
arrest context? Notably, in subsequent Supreme Court decisions
citing to Wong Wing for the assertion that detention is necessarily part of the deportation process, no litigants raised a
Fourth Amendment challenge.117 And, the Wong Wing Court
confirmed that the Constitution applies to those who are undocumented, notwithstanding the Court’s prior affirmations of Congress’s plenary power over immigration law.118 The Court’s later

114. Id. at 235.
115. See id.
116. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“When the stakes are
this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential.”).
117. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (finding no Fifth Amendment due process claim for mandatory detention pending removal proceedings);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555–56 (1952) (finding no merit to Fifth and
Eighth Amendment challenges). In the 2003 Demore v. Kim case, nobody challenged the neutrality of the judge; indeed, Mr. Kim would have welcomed any
hearing before an immigration judge, since he had no hearing to review his detention. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514; see also Kagan, supra note 13, at 154
(“Demore . . . stand[s] for the rule that Congress may designate a particular
class of people for mandatory detention while their cases are pending based on
a presumption of flight risk or dangerousness. But this does not address the
procedural safeguards required to determine whether a person actually belongs
in this disfavored class.”). When the Court decided Carlson in 1952, the right to
a probable cause hearing by a neutral judge after a warrantless arrest had yet
to be established in the criminal justice context, much less applied to pretrial
detention during the deportation process. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (establishing Fourth Amendment right to neutral judge review of probable cause to
continue detention after arrest in 1975). Also, at that time the Court had not
yet clarified that the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative arrests. See
Kagan, supra note 13, at 134 (discussing Camara v. Municipal Court, in which
the Court held in 1967 that the Fourth Amendment applies to civil and administrative searches).
118. See Neuman, supra note 110, at 41 (describing Wong Wing as “a series
of firsts . . . the first Supreme Court decision invalidating a federal immigration
statute, the first Supreme Court holding that the Bill of Rights protects aliens
against the federal government, and the first Supreme Court confirmation of
the constitutional rights of illegal aliens”); see also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L. J. 1003, 1016
(2002) (“[A]t the very height of deference to plenary immigration power, the
Court in Wong Wing applied to immigration detention the same principle that
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decisions also confirmed that the plenary power does not diminish all Fourth Amendment rights.119 Moreover, immigration detention pending removal proceedings today frequently lasts well
beyond the thirty minutes it took for Wong Wing to be deported:
for a class of detainees challenging their prolonged detention,
detention lengths averaged between 346 to 427 days, with some
lasting up to 1,585 days.120
The plenary power relates to the political branches’ power
to exclude121 and deport;122 it should not extend to the power to
detain. As David Cole has noted, the defenders of unchecked detention as part of the deportation process “have confused the
power to deport with the power to detain,”123 and thus have unnecessarily extended the political branches’ plenary power over
decisions to expel and deport to detention decisions during those
processes.124 Also, as stated by the Supreme Court in the 2001

it has subsequently applied in other civil detention cases: an absolute prohibition on the use of civil detention for punitive ends.” (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S.
at 235)).
119. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973). But cf. United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (describing federal government’s authority to conduct routine, suspicionless searches at the border as “plenary” (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977))).
120. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d,
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The Rodriguez class was subdivided into three subclasses. For those subject to mandatory detention pursuant
to 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(c), the average length of detention was 427 days, with the
longest-detained class member confined for 1,585 days (and counting). Id. The
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) subclass members had been detained for as long as 831 days,
and for an average of 346 days each. Id. at 1081. At the time petitioners generated their report, one 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) subclass member had been detained for
1,234 days with no definite end in sight. Id. at 1085.
121. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (“For more than a
century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign
nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977))).
122. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (applying plenary power to deportation decisions).
123. Cole, supra note 118, at 1038.
124. Id. at 1016; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (1984) (“[T]he detention authority is more
than a programmatic resource, ancillary to the power to exclude and deport.
Detention is also an awesome power in its own right.”).
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case of Zadvydas v. Davis,125 “[the plenary power] is subject to
important constitutional limitations.”126
Second, the Court in Gerstein limited its holding to the criminal justice system; it was never intended to apply outside of that
context.127 But in another civil detention system in which juveniles are arrested for delinquency, the Court in Schall v. Martin128 used Gerstein as a benchmark in a procedural Due Process
analysis.129 The Court determined that the procedures afforded
to juveniles by the state, which included a probable cause hearing before a Family Court judge within three days, would be constitutionally adequate under Gerstein.130 As noted by the Ninth
Circuit, however, the juvenile procedures in place under the
state law were more protective than Gerstein hearings as they
existed at the time, and thus the Court never reached whether

125. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
126. Id. at 695. For example, federal courts have not found the Court’s 1953
decision in Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei to stand for the sweeping proposition that persons seeking admission have no constitutional rights when making
claims related to their detention. 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953); see also RosalesGarcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 414 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that to the extent that Mezei stands for the proposition that arriving aliens have no constitutional rights, cases in which “the contours of constitutionally permissible civil
detention are rigorously delineated” is a “substantial jurisprudential development from the time that Mezei was decided” (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1987))); Chi Thon
Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The case before us does not question the validity of the procedures used to admit or exclude petitioner, but it is
against that backdrop that we consider whether the indeterminable nature of
his detention pending ultimate deportation rises to a constitutional violation.
Even an excludable alien is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and
is thus entitled to substantive due process.”).
127. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (“The Fourth
Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define
the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of person or property in criminal cases,
including the detention of suspects pending trial.”); Flores I, 913 F.2d 1335,
1336 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Project Release v. Provost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d
Cir. 1983) (declining to extend Gerstein to civil commitment statutes and finding
no due process violation when the state statute provides for a judicial hearing
within five days of demand by patient, relative, or friend, as well as habeas corpus relief).
128. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
129. Id. at 274–75.
130. Id. at 274–77.
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less process would be constitutionally adequate.131 Also, the Supreme Court has described juvenile delinquency proceedings as
“functionally akin to a criminal trial,”132 and thus deserving of
near-identical procedures to those used in the criminal justice
process.133 Yet many have made that same argument about deportation proceedings—that although civil, “deportation is different,”134 and thus deserving of heightened procedural protections akin to those seen in the juvenile delinquency system.135
This is especially so after the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision
in Padilla v. Kentucky,136 where the Court recognized a Sixth
Amendment right to advice regarding immigration consequences,137 a watershed decision that caused many to question
whether the Court now sees deportation as deserving of more
procedures than are available in other civil contexts.138 Peter
131. Flores I, 913 F.2d at 1336.
132. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1967).
133. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that due process
requires that the burden of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings be beyond
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31–56 (1967) (explaining that due
process requires right to appropriate notice, counsel, confrontation and crossexamination, and privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency
proceedings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966) (explaining that
due process requires the right to a hearing, that counsel be given access to records, and a statement of reasons before a case is transferred from juvenile court
to adult court). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding
that the right to trial by jury in juvenile delinquency proceedings is not required
under the due process clause).
134. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1299 (2011).
135. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1890, 1931–32 (2000) (arguing that juvenile delinquency proceedings can
provide an example of proceedings that are civil in name but many of the protections of a criminal trial attach); Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A
New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 49–57
(2011) (discussing how juvenile delinquency proceedings can provide a helpful
analogy to how procedural protections should apply in deportation proceedings);
Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of
the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305, 316–17 (2000) (discussing juvenile delinquency proceedings as a
“quasi-criminal” proceeding where some of the constitutional protections of a
criminal trial are available even though the proceeding is nominally civil).
136. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
137. Id. at 374.
138. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right
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Markowitz has described the Padilla decision as one more example of where the Court has allowed “a uniquely criminal law doctrine [to] creep[]…into the ‘civil’ deportation realm.”139 He explains that the Court’s watered-down application of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule in Lopez-Mendoza is another example of the Court allowing “the criminal square peg [to] fit in
the civil round holes,”140 notwithstanding the Court’s early labeling of deportation as “civil.”141 Thus, there is every reason to apply Gerstein out of its original criminal context when the issue is
pre-trial detention for deportation.
In other civil detention contexts, the statutes authorizing
such detention frequently had a judge overseeing the detention
decision, so when challenged under the Due Process Clause, the
neutrality of the decision-maker is rarely discussed.142 In the
context of deciding the procedures necessary for parole revocation, in Morrissey v. Brewer143 the Court held that due process
required an independent decision-maker, but that need not be a
to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV.
305, 319 (2011); Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla
v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011); Maddali, supra note 135; Markowitz, supra note
134.
139. Markowitz, supra note 134, at 1324.
140. Id. at 1318.
141. Id. at 1311–12 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893)).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (pretrial
detention based on dangerousness is decided in full adversarial hearing presided over by a neutral judge); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil
detention for mental illness and danger to self or others authorized by a judge).
In Parham v. J.R., the Court found that a treating psychiatrist was neutral
enough to commit a minor to a mental hospital. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). However,
the Court did not believe that such decisions required a full adversarial hearing;
nor did the Court describe the institution’s psychiatrists who made the decisions
as acting in any sort of a zealous manner pursuant to some law enforcement
purpose, the way that ICE officers act. Compare id. at 615–16 (quoting district
court’s findings that it was “impressed by the conscientious, dedicated state employed psychiatrists who, with the help of equally conscientious, dedicated state
employed psychologists and social workers, faithfully care for the plaintiff children” (quoting J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1976))), with
Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.ice
.gov/about [https://perma.cc/5ZBU-EW7R] (describing ICE Enforcement and
Removal operations as “identif[ying] and apprehend[ing] removable aliens, detain[ing] these individuals when necessary and remov[ing] illegal aliens from
the United States”).
143. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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judicial officer, so long as it was an “independent decisionmaker.”144 Morrissey was a due process case, not a Fourth
Amendment case, so the Court was not examining the procedures through the Gerstein lens (nor had Gerstein yet been decided).145 It is also instructive to examine the subsequent developments around parole revocation in the federal system; four
years after Morrissey was decided, Congress created the U.S. Parole Commission as an independent agency within the DOJ.146
One of the reasons to create such an independent agency was to
separate parole decision-making from the prosecutors in the
DOJ.147
Third, the thousands of immigration arrests happening each
year, although not reviewed by a neutral judge, are “reasonable”
seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment148 because their purpose is not primarily to investigate crime, but to
enforce a civil regulatory scheme.149 In the 1967 case Camara v.

144. Id. at 486.
145. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, highlighted that this supposedly “independent” decision-maker is not truly independent. See id. at 497–98 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (“The hearing should not be before the parole officer, as he is the
one who is making the charge and ‘there is inherent danger in combining the
functions of judge and advocate.’”).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b) (2012). The House Conference Report creating
the Parole Commission stated that the law was necessary in order to create a
less disparate and more predictable process that both prisoners and the public
would more readably understand and accept. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-838, at 20
(1976) (Conf. Rep.).
147. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-838, at 20; see also S. REP. NO. 94-369, at 20 (1975)
(noting that even though the Commission would be part of the Department of
Justice, having a decision-making process that was independent from the Department would guard against influence in cases).
148. See Robert M. Bloom, Border Searches in the Age of Terrorism, 78 MISS.
L. J. 295, 299 (2008) (describing reasonableness as “touchstone” for Fourth
Amendment rights); Chacón, supra note 66, at 134 (“[T]he test for Fourth
Amendment ‘reasonableness’ turns on the balance between the government’s
interest and the individual’s right to privacy.”).
149. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (declining to
suspend usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police set up
a non-border checkpoint “primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes”); see also Carbado & Harris, supra note 66, at 1608–13 (explaining that
one reason why Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases involving racial profiling of Latinos do not “occupy significant space in the literature on racial profiling” is because these cases are not centrally about the enforcement of criminal
law and thus are seen by criminal law scholars as part of the Court’s “‘special
needs’/regulatory/administrative search and seizure jurisprudence”).
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Municipal Court,150 the Supreme Court permitted health inspectors to search houses without individualized suspicion of a violation.151 The Court, however, still required an “area warrant” issued by a judge so as to limit the discretion of each inspector.152
In the immigration detention context, the intrusion is significantly more—the taking away of physical liberty, not the search
of one’s house.153 Nor does it seem plausible that the thousands
of noncitizens subject to immigration detention should have a
reduced expectation of privacy that would justify being put in a
jail, as would the owner of a “closely regulated” industry whose
business property may be subject to warrantless inspection.154
Fourth, “[s]pecial needs”155 such as border control justify immigration arrests and detention without the approval of a neutral judge.156 This would likely be the most-favored response of
150. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
151. Id. at 536–37.
152. Id.
153. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 555–56
(1985) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Something has gone fundamentally awry in our
constitutional jurisprudence when a neutral and detached magistrate’s authorization is required before the authorities may inspect ‘the plumbing, heating,
ventilation, gas, and electrical systems’ in a person’s home, . . . or poke through
the charred remains of his gutted garage, but not before they may hold him in
indefinite involuntary isolation at the Nation’s border to investigate whether he
might be engaged in criminal wrongdoing.” (alteration in original)); cf. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that privacy expectations are less in a car than in one’s private dwelling).
154. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) (“A central difference
between [the business regulation] cases and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens
as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petition here was not engaged
in any regulated or licensed business.”).
155. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (setting forth three-part test for reasonableness of warrantless inspections of commercial properties); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67, 81–83 (2001) (explaining that a hospital’s sharing of diagnostic tests for
pregnant women with police not justified by special need even if the ultimate
purpose is to protect the health of the mother and child); Michigan Dep’t. of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that a sobriety checkpoint
is a special law enforcement concern that justifies highway stop without any
individualized suspicion).
156. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“That searches
made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border,

1304

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1275

the Trump administration, which sees detention as one of the
only ways to deter illegal border crossers,157 who, in the view of
many within the administration, are taking advantage of procedural rights built into U.S. immigration law to stay in the U.S.
while fighting against deportation.158 It is quite possible that detaining noncitizens who present themselves at the border or
port-of-entry for no more than forty-eight hours in order to issue
an expedited removal order would pass a reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment.159 However, seizing and jailing
thousands of people suspected of immigration violations who are
found anywhere within the interior of the U.S. is a far cry from
the brief stops of vehicles or persons, which are justified when
they occur at a checkpoint near the border or port-of-entry.160
That may be true, but many have argued that the border
has extended further inside of the perimeter of the U.S.161 In

should, by now, require no extended demonstration.”); Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 552–53, 557 (finding that stops of motorists at permanent checkpoints
near the border are justified by the important law enforcement concern of policing a southern border that is 2,000 miles long); Chacón, supra note 66, at 133;
Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1190–91 (2008) (“The ‘border exception’ sits at the intersection of two established and much criticized areas of constitutional doctrine: the ‘plenary power’ doctrine and the various
exceptions to ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements for primarily administrative, noncriminal searches and seizures. Both areas are highly deferential
to government actions, and many of the criticisms of the deference extended in
those areas apply with comparable force to the deference afforded the government under the border exception.”).
157. See, e.g., Border Security Executive Order, supra note 20; Border Security Implementation Memo, supra note 20.
158. See Philip Rucker & David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving Undocumented Immigrants of Due-Process Rights, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-advocates-depriving
-undocumented-immigrants-of-due-process-rights/2018/06/24/dfa45d36-77bd
-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.05c119748f4a [https://perma.cc/R9K3-TLDC].
159. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 541–43
(1985) (permitting detention for sixteen hours at an international border based
on reasonable suspicion by customs agents that she was smuggling contraband
in her alimentary canal); Holper, supra note 15, at 938–39 (describing expedited
removal procedures).
160. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533, 538; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
161. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556 (“Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a traffic-checking program in the interior is neces-
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fact, Daniel Kanstroom has categorized an entire class of deportation cases as “extended border control” deportations.162 “Extended border control” deportations happen when the noncitizen
has not been admitted to the U.S. or has been admitted but violates the rules that govern his temporary residence.163 In contrast, “post-entry social control” deportations involve noncitizens
who have been admitted to the U.S., under a permanent or temporary status, and are deportable because of criminal or political
conduct—conduct that arose after they were admitted.164 If, at
least in “extended border control” deportations, the government
can cite to the “special need” of border control to justify immigration arrests and detention without the approval of a neutral
judge,165 then a significant number of immigration arrests without the involvement of a neutral judge would comply with the
Fourth Amendment. The problem with this rationale is that it
takes a Fourth Amendment doctrine that was intended to tip the
balance of interests in favor of the government where governmental power is at its “zenith”—at the international border166—
and applies it when the governmental power has dwindled—
within the interior of the U.S.167 Even one of the first cases in
which the Supreme Court affirmed the “border exception” to the
sary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border.”); Chacón, supra note 66, at 145 n.99 (citing to circuit court cases expanding
the border search doctrine to searches occurring near the border and reasoning
that although “quite modest, they demonstrate the malleability of the concept”
(citing United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 949 (7th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 1994))); see also Ayelet Shachar, The
Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 174
(2007) (describing how expedited removal has allowed the border to become “detached from its traditional location at the perimeter of the country’s edges . . . by
relying on the legal fiction of removing unwanted migrants ‘at the border’ when
they are already firmly within its perimeter”).
162. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (2007).
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id. at 6.
165. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–43; Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 557.
166. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is
at its zenith at the international border.”).
167. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international
border than in the interior.”); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617–18
(1977).
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Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States,168 limited the geographic scope of the border.169 In
this sense, ICE agents who arrest and detain noncitizens for deportation are no different than police arresting persons upon
suspicion of illegal conduct, and the decisions of these “zealous
officers” must be checked by a “neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in [enforcement].”170 And, as the Court stated in Almeida-Sanchez, “[t]he
needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these
pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.”171
Thus, the reasonableness of the seizures and subsequent detentions for deportation should be made on a case-by-case basis172 and by a neutral judge. If the current immigration system
lacks such truly neutral judges,173 as I argue in the next section,
then the entire immigration detention system is regularly violating the Fourth Amendment rights of those caught in its increasingly broad net.
II. THE NOT-SO-NEUTRAL IMMIGRATION JUDGE
This Part demonstrates why the current immigration judges
cannot systemically provide the “neutral judge” review required
to authorize continued detention under the Fourth Amendment.
While I recognize that there are many fair, impartial immigration judges, including before whom I have practiced, this anecdotal evidence cannot change the underlying structural issues
that cause judges to rely on the DOJ for their professional livelihoods, or the statutes and regulations in place that allow their
168. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
169. See id. at 268 (holding that stop and search of automobiles without a
warrant or probable cause violates Fourth Amendment when occurring twentyfive miles from the border); Chacón, supra note 66, at 137 (“Almeida-Sanchez
therefore can be read as an affirmation of the breadth of border search authority
and a limitation on the geographic scope of this border exceptionalism.”).
170. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1975) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)).
171. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
172. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564–66 (1976) (permitting border checkpoint without issuance of an “area” warrant by a judge).
173. See infra Part II.
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supposedly neutral detention decisions to be overridden by a
DHS prosecutor.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMINGLED PROSECUTORIAL AND
ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS
Administrative agencies, the “fourth branch of government,”174 have had increasing broad power to carry out important functions of government, such as setting forth law, adjudicating cases, and prosecuting cases.175 Concern about agencies’
serious impacts on private rights with limited restraints, created
a call for a uniform structure to agency decision-making.176 In
the 1930s, the American Bar Association saw the undermining
of the judicial branch by the creation of agencies.177 Advocates
for reform had a choice between “bringing the resolution of controversies back to the court system and bringing court rules to
the administrative system”;178 and since the benefits of administrative adjudication were well-recognized at this point, “[t]he effort later turned from bringing administrative proceedings into
a federal court system to bringing court standards into the administrative proceedings.”179
President Roosevelt created a Committee on Administrative
Management, which reported its findings in 1937; the President
also assigned the Attorney General to name a similar committee
in 1939.180 After legislative hearings, at which all existing administrative agencies were invited to submit their views,181 the

174. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) (describing
the place of administrative agencies within the constitutional framework).
175. See id. at 578–59 (noting the acceptance of agencies who exercise judicial, legislative, and executive functions but fall outside the three branches).
176. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–38 (1950) (discussing
the growing concerns about agency power and the call to implement safeguards), superseded by statute, Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, Pub.
L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1044; see also Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
177. Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45
AKRON L. REV. 647, 691 (2012).
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 829, 843–44 (2004)).
180. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 38.
181. Id. at 40.
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was signed into law by
President Truman in 1946.182
Among other requirements, the APA provides for the separation of the adjudicative and prosecutorial functions.183 Specifically, the APA requires that an adjudicatory officer shall not “be
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions for any agency.”184 Also, “[a]n employee or
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review . . . except as witness or counsel in
public proceedings.”185
Justifying the separation of functions, the President’s Committee on Administrative Management noted concerns when
“[t]he discretionary work of the administrator is merged with
that of the judge”186 because “[p]ressures and influences properly
enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and
administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in
which to adjudicate private rights.”187 The Committee also found
that having one person serve as both prosecutor and judge “undermines judicial fairness” and “weakens public confidence in
that fairness.”188 Similarly, the Attorney General’s Committee
on Administrative Procedure found that “commingling of functions of investigation or advocacy with the function of deciding
are . . . plainly undesirable” and thus recommended the creation

182. Id. at 40 (citing 92 CONG. REC. 6706 (1946)).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012).
184. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40.
185. Id. The APA language regarding separation of functions is largely the
same as when the APA first was enacted in 1946. See id. at 35 n.1 (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 5 (1946)).
186. Id. at 41–42 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37
(1937)).
187. Id. at 42.
188. Id.; see also Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 390
(“[T]he more a governmental function resembles legislation or other policymaking, the more a representative democracy values political accountability over
decisional independence. For that reason, it is only in the adjudication context—
not in the legislative or implementation contexts—that I claim a normative link
between decisional independence and the rule of law.”).
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of independent hearing commissioners “insulated from all
phases of a case other than hearing and deciding . . . .”189
After the passage of the APA, the issue of whether deportation hearings complied with the APA’s required separation of adjudicatory and prosecutorial roles reached the Supreme Court in
the 1950 case Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath.190 Mr. Sung had
been ordered to be deported by a “presiding inspector,” who
played the part of both prosecutor and judge.191 The Court wrote,
“while he is today hearing cases investigated by a colleague, tomorrow his investigation of a case may be heard before the inspector whose case he passes on today.”192 Deciding that the provisions of the APA applied to deportation cases, the Court held
that having the special inquiry officer serve both the role of prosecutor and judge violated the APA’s provisions.193 Following
“[t]he torpedo delivered by the 1950 Sung decision,”194 the INS
made temporary appointments of APA Hearing Examiners, giving incumbent presiding inspectors such appointments.195
Wong Yang Sung’s effect in immigration law was shortlived.196 The INS and the DOJ requested an exemption from APA

189. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 44 (quoting S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 56 (1941),
ATT’Y GEN. COMM. ADMIN. PROCEDURE, REPORT 56 (1941)).
190. 339 U.S. 33. In 1940, there had been a study of the immigration procedures by a committee named by the Secretary of Labor, who then had jurisdiction over immigration matters; this study recommended that presiding inspectors be relieved of their prosecutorial duties. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at
42–44 (quoting SEC’Y OF LABOR’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 77 (mimeo. 1940)); see also id. at 44 (“A
genuinely impartial hearing, conducted with critical detachment, is psychologically improbable if not impossible, when the presiding officer has at once the
responsibility of appraising the strength of the case and of seeking to make it
as strong as possible.” (citation omitted)).
191. Id. at 45. The regulations at the time prohibited the presiding inspector
from being the one who investigated the case, unless the noncitizen consented.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 150.6(b) (1949)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 45–48.
194. Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASE 453, 456 (1988).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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coverage, and Congress quickly delivered in a 1950 appropriations bill.197 Two years later, Congress passed the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which specifically exempted deportation proceedings from the APA’s
requirements.198 The Court recognized this exemption in the
1954 case of Marcello v. Bonds,199 reasoning that Congress had
deliberately legislated deportation proceedings out of the APA’s
hearing requirements.200 Mr. Marcello had received what was
then termed a “two-man” hearing (unlike Sung’s “one-man hearing”),201 in which a special inquiry officer presided over his case,
but a different immigration officer presented the evidence.202
The presiding officer was subject to the supervision and control
of officials within the prosecuting agency, however.203 The Court
held that this arrangement did not violate his due process rights,
“when considered against the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in
the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account
in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration
matters.”204
With the 1952 INA, Congress buried the term “presiding inspector” and replaced it with “special inquiry officers.”205 The
hiring process for special inquiry officers also changed in later
years to give preference to holders of college and law degrees (instead of those with border patrol experience, which was previously rewarded in hiring for INS officers).206 The DOJ continued
to make small steps toward adjudicators’ independence, remov-

197. Id. at 456–57; see also Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951, ch.
1052, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048 (1950).
198. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, sec. 403, § (a)(47), 66
Stat. 163, 280.
199. 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955).
200. Id. at 308–09.
201. See Rawitz, supra note 194, at 454 (discussing the differences between
two-man hearings and one-man hearings).
202. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306.
203. Id. at 311.
204. Id.
205. Rawitz, supra note 194, at 456–57.
206. Daniel Kanstroom, The Long, Complex, and Futile Deportation Saga of
Carlos Marcello, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 113, 128 (David A. Martin & Peter
H. Schuck eds. 2005); Rawitz, supra note 194, at 457.
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ing special inquiry officers from INS District Director supervision and creating the position of Chief Special Inquiry Officer in
1956.207 In every case where deportability was contested, it was
required that there be a separate prosecutor and special inquiry
officer, who would have his own file, in order to insulate the special inquiry officer from the prejudicial contents of the prosecution’s file.208
All immigration adjudicators continued to answer to the Attorney General, although the Supreme Court interpreted regulations enacted to accompany the 1952 INA as requiring the
Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) to exercise independent
judgment.209 In the 1954 case Accardi v. Shaughnessy, a noncitizen had been denied discretionary relief because he was on a list
of “unsavory characters” issued by the Attorney General.210 The
Court held that the Board failed to exercise its own independent
discretion, pursuant to its regulation, and remanded the case.211
On remand, however, the Board reached the same conclusion,
which the Court found was free of undue influence by the Attorney General.212 In Mr. Marcello’s case, the Attorney General
publicly stated that Mr. Marcello was “undesirable” and “that
the proceedings were specially designed to deport” him, and that
his name was on a list that the Attorney General desired to deport.213 Yet, the Supreme Court found that there was no specific
evidence that the Board prejudged his claim and thus the Board
had in fact engaged in the exercise of independent judgment.214
So, while this “independent judgement” regulation has existed
on paper, enforcing some internal version of separating adjudicators from policymakers,215 as demonstrated by these two Supreme Court cases, it is not very meaningful in practice.
207. Rawitz, supra note 194, at 458.
208. Kanstroom, supra note 206, at 128; Rawitz, supra note 194, at 458.
209. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
210. Id. at 264.
211. Id. at 267–68.
212. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 282–83
(1955).
213. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 312 (1955).
214. Id. at 312–14.
215. See Kim, supra note 30, at 42 (“[T]he [Accardi] holding can be understood as promoting a version of internal separation of powers.”); see also id. at
10–12 (describing different functions of an agency, which including adjudicative
or quasi-adjudicative, legislative or quasi-legislative, and purely ministerial).

1312

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1275

In 1983, the adjudicators were officially moved out of the
INS, with the creation of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR).216 The new EOIR housed the Board and the nowtitled “immigration judges,” a title that began in 1973, with the
practice of wearing robes in the courtroom.217 However, the Attorney General was still the boss of both the immigration judges
and the Board.218 Also, the Supreme Court in 1991 affirmed that
Marcello holding, notwithstanding the creation of the EOIR, and
held that deportation proceedings were still not “adversary adjudications” under the APA.219
There also arose separate procedures within immigration
law for sanctioning employers, which came about in the late
1980’s. The introduction of employer penalties into immigration
law with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act220 saw a
new model of adjudication, now that the questions were no
longer concerning the rights of “aliens” but also U.S. citizen employers were subject to sanctions for illegally hiring undocumented workers.221 There has been little criticism of this disjointed system of administrative procedures within the INA,
216. Board of Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial
Amendments, 48 Fed. Reg. 8056 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 0).
217. Rawitz, supra note 194, at 458.
218. Board of Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial
Amendments, 48 Fed. Reg. at 8056.
219. In the 1991 case of Ardestani v. INS, the Court affirmed the Marcello
holding that deportation proceedings were exempted from the APA, holding that
there could be no award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
for prevailing in a deportation hearing, because such a hearing was not technically an “adversary adjudication” under the APA. 502 U.S. 129, 133–34, 139
(1991). The Court in Ardestani made such a holding notwithstanding the promulgation of the 1983 regulations that created the EOIR, which the Court described as “conform[ing] deportation hearings more closely to the procedures
required for formal adjudication under the APA.” Id. at 134.
220. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359. For a summary of the legislative history leading up to the employer
sanctions provisions of IRCA, see Michael Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment
of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193
(2007).
221. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 274A(e)(1)(A)(4). The employer
sanction provisions of IRCA led to the creation of the Office of Chief Hearing
Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) within the EOIR, which employs
ALJs appointed pursuant to the APA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2019); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 44.100, 68.26 (“Hearings shall be held before an Administrative Law Judge
appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and assigned to the Department of Justice.”).
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where the business owner gets a hearing before a “real” administrative law judge222 and the noncitizen gets an “imitation
judge.”223 This would seem to be one more example of where, as
Jack Chin has noted, “administrative procedure tends to offer
greater protection to businesses than to individuals.”224 Administrative law scholar Paul Verkuil, defending this disparate
treatment, stated,
The decider independence issue is especially sensitive in the context of employer sanctions. Whereas there is little doubt that the immigration judge structure satisfies the due process standards of independence for decisions about aliens, the structure must be examined
more closely when those normally outside the reach of the system are
to be brought within it.225

B. THE “WAR ON INDEPENDENCE” IN THE POST-9/11 ERA
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress in 2002 created the DHS, which would house all functions of the former INS, including prosecutorial functions.226 As
a result of this legislation, which went into effect in 2003, immigration prosecutors no longer worked within the same agency as
the adjudicators.227 Yet, scholars and the National Association of
OCAHO judges are authorized to sanction employers who have engaged in unfair immigration-related employment practices and illegally hired workers; they
also can issue civil penalties for document fraud. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 270.1–.3 (defining document fraud and describing procedures to enforce civil sanctions); 8
C.F.R. § 274A.9 (defining procedures for administrative sanctions against employers who knowingly illegally hire undocumented workers); 28 C.F.R.
§ 44.200 (defining unfair immigration-related employment practices).
222. See William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 883 (2006) (describing the Wong Yang Sung Court’s concern with the “embodiment in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and
judge,” which was remedied by the APA’s creation of ALJs, then called hearing
examiners, as well as providing for the separation of functions in 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d)).
223. See Slavin & Harbeck, supra note 6, at 70.
224. Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
225. Paul Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1195 (1984).
226. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2136.
227. The explanatory notes to the implementing regulations state, “[t]his
rule is also a step in the process of separating DHS enforcement and services
functions from Department of Justice adjudication functions as envisioned by
the Act.” Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security; Delegations of Authority; Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,922, 10,922 (Mar. 6, 2003).
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Immigration Judges noted that such changes did not fully eviscerate a fundamental truth: that judges are housed within the
DOJ, “an agency that is closely aligned with the DHS and shares
its primary mission of law enforcement rather than objective adjudication.”228 As Gerald Neuman has observed, “[t]he Attorney
General . . . and other political appointees in the Justice Department are politically accountable for their success in creating the
reality or appearance of border control, in general or in well-publicized cases.”229 The simultaneous “war on terror” caused the
DOJ to step up enforcement efforts within immigration law.230
At the same time that Congress officially separated the immigration prosecutors from adjudicators with the Homeland Security Act, the Attorney General began what Stephen Legomsky
has called a “war on independence” of the EOIR adjudicators.231
He outlines three types of constraints that executive or legislative actors can impose on the authority of the adjudicator: the
substitution of a general rule for individualized adjudication or
judgment; a decision by an executive or administrative official to
intervene in a pending case; and a threat of personal consequences to adjudicators, including reassignment to a less desirable position, nonrenewal of appointment, or loss of compensation, if they do not reach a certain type of outcome. In his article,
he focuses on the third type of decisional independence.232
In 2002, not long after the National Association of Immigration Judges had issued a proposal for an independent court, the
Attorney General published a final rule that reduced the size of
228. Leigh Marks, Still a Legal Cinderella, supra note 6, at 29.
229. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1024 (1998).
230. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1135 (2008) (noting how the
“war on terror” led to the radical changes in immigration enforcement); Jennifer
M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1571–73 (2010) (discussing how federal immigration enforcement is expanding).
231. See Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 370 (“As hyperbolic as the title of this Article might sound, I submit it is accurate to depict the
sum of these various measures as an all-out war on the very notion of decisional
independence in the adjudication of immigration cases.”).
232. Id. at 387–88. The automatic stay described in Part II.C is an example
Legomsky cites of a substitution of a general rule for an individualized determination, which undermines judges’ independence. Id.
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the Board.233 This caused Board members who had ruled most
frequently in favor of immigrants to be reassigned to non-adjudicative positions within the Department;234 data also showed
that in the one-year period following this announcement but before the reassignments, Board members began to rule less frequently against the government.235 Another study showed that
after the reassignments, outcomes in Board cases were significantly less favorable to immigrants.236 In response to concerns
that the reassignments were punishment for ruling against the
government, the DOJ responded:
Each Board member is a Department of Justice Attorney who is appointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney General. All attorneys in the Department are excepted employees, subject
to removal by the Attorney General, and may be transferred from and
to assignments as necessary to fulfill the Department’s mission.237

The DOJ provided no real explanation for the study’s findings,
thus confirming fears that an adjudicator can be re-assigned to
a non-adjudicative position as a form of reprimand.238 These reassignments marked the first time in the Board’s history that an
Attorney General had removed a member.239
The 2002 final DOJ rule also identified a different degree of
independence by the Board.240 Until 2002, a regulation stated
that “Board Members shall exercise their independent judgment
233. Id. at 373–74. See also infra note 340 (discussing various proposals that
have been suggested).
234. Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 376 (“Data compiled
by Peter Levinson, a long-time member of the legal staff of the House Judiciary
Committee, show that the axe fell entirely on the most ‘liberal’ members of the
BIA, as measured by the percentages of their rulings in favor of noncitizens.”
(citing Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004))).
235. Id. at 377 (citing Levinson, supra note 234, at 1159–60).
236. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at
1670 (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION’ COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO
BONO RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT app. 24 (2003), http://files.dorsey.com/files/Upload/
DorseyStudyABA.pdf).
237. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 3).
238. See Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 374–75 (discussing how the changes have further heightened apprehensions).
239. Id. at 379.
240. Id.; Levinson, supra note 234, at 1161.
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and discretion in cases coming before the Board.”241 The new rule
rearranged the priorities, stating that “Board members shall be
attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them”;242
only later does a “diluted version” of the decision independence
language appear.243 Stephen Legomsky noted that although the
reassignments impacted only Board members, “the reference to
‘[a]ll attorneys’ makes clear that the attorney general intended
the quoted language to apply to immigration judges as well.”244
In the current administration, former Attorney General Sessions
reminded immigration judges of their subservient role in carrying out the Trump administration’s priorities of having “zero illegal immigration in this country.”245
In 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced a system of
performance evaluations for each immigration judge and Board
member.246 Regulations went into effect in 2007 which made explicit the legal authority to establish such a performance evaluation system, without any input or public disclosure of the procedures or criteria for determining what constitutes good

241. Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 379 (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(a)(1) (2002)).
242. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1), (d)(1)(ii) (2003)).
243. Id. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019) (“Subject to these governing
standards, Board members shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the
Board . . . .”).
244. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at
1670.
245. As Catherine Kim writes, in remarks during the EOIR’s Legal Training
Program, Sessions asserted, “[a]ll of us should agree that, by definition, we
ought to have zero illegal immigration in this country,” and reminded IJs in
attendance that they must “conduct designated proceedings ‘subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.’” Kim, supra note 30, at 22 (quoting Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney
Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training
Program in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2018)).
246. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law
Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 475, 496 (2007) (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and
Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2006/August/06_ag_520.html [https://perma.cc/EBU4-HZ85]).
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“performance.”247 Legomsky writes that the combined effect of
the reassignments of Board members, adjusted “independence”
regulations, and performance evaluations “remind surviving and
future BIA members and immigration judges that they hold
their jobs at the discretion of one of the opposing parties in the
cases that come before them.”248 Regardless of how much faith
one might have in a current Attorney General to not malevolently use reassignments and bad performance evaluations
against an individual adjudicator, he writes, “adjudicators can
never again feel confident ruling against the government in
close, controversial, or high-visibility cases.”249
Another affront to immigration judges’ decisional independence came with “case completion goals,” which the DOJ formally
implemented in 2002.250 Although the scheduling of a case does
not, at first glance, appear to seriously constrain a judge’s independence, time limits tend to favor the government251 because it
can take time to both become eligible for relief from removal
(since a petition can be pending with a different agency such as
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) and develop positive discretionary factors.252 For detainees, the set case completion goal of ninety days253 can present a roadblock to getting an
attorney, obtaining corroborating documents, and providing expert testimony, all of which are key to helping the detainee

247. Id. (citing Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673,
53,675 (Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240)).
248. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at
1671.
249. Id. at 1677.
250. As a result of requirements imposed by the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993, the Department of Justice had to quantify achievements and accountability. The DOJ chose to establish “adjudication priorities”
for the Immigration Court and elected to measure its success by evaluating
whether courts met these case-completion goals. Slavin & Marks, supra note 6,
at 1787 n.13 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING
NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 20–21 (Aug. 2006)).
251. See Kim, supra note 30, at 32.
252. See id.
253. Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge,
EOIR, to all Immigration Judges et al., Case Completion Goals (Apr. 26, 2002),
http://www.aila.org/infonet/ocij-describes-case-completion-goals [https://perma
.cc/B3JD-TQ3E].
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win.254 Many have critiqued the DOJ’s management of judges’
caseloads as an example of DOJ’s undue influence over judges.255
Case completion goals were implemented by court and at first
were not imposed on individual judges,256 yet evidence demonstrated that individual judges felt the impact of these goals, citing them in decisions that denied continuances to noncitizens.257
Although the EOIR publicly stated that case completion goals
would not impact individual judges for failure to comply,258 a
2008 study concerning immigration judge burnout revealed a
common perception that these case goals were mandatory.259 Immigration judges reported that the goals created a work environment where they are unable to adjudicate cases fairly and independently.260
Today, early critics of case completion goals have seen their
fears play out. Former Attorney General Sessions referred to
himself a case involving the authority to grant continuances, requiring judges to factor in both “administrative efficiency” (case
completion goals) and DHS objections when deciding whether to
grant continuances to noncitizens whose applications for relief
are pending before different agencies.261 In announcing this policy, he reversed portions of the Board’s 2009 decision in Matter
of Hashmi that specifically prohibited judges from citing to case

254. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access
to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2015) (presenting
statistics from an empirical study that demonstrated that detainees were five
times less likely to obtain representation than nondetained respondents, and
without representation, were more likely to lose their cases and be deported).
255. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 6, at 1 (“The sharp increase in the
number of cases in Immigration Courts over the past decade, without a corresponding increase in resources, lies at the root of many of these problems.”).
256. See Slavin & Marks, supra note 6, at 1787.
257. See id. at 1788.
258. See Statement, supra note 6, at 7.
259. See Slavin & Marks, supra note 6, at 1787–88; see also Stuart L. Lustig
et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 57, 64–65 (2008) (quoting one immigration judge, who stated, “[w]hat is
required to meet the case completions is quantity over quality”).
260. Lustig et al., supra note 259, at 64–65; see also Slavin & Marks, supra
note 6, at 1787 (“In the Immigration Court System, these ‘goals’ have become
an undue and sometimes unseen pressure on an immigration judge’s ability to
render a thorough, well-reasoned decision.”).
261. See In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. 405, 415–17 (A.G. 2018).
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completion goals when deciding whether to continue a case,262
which the Board decided after a reprimand from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.263 In a similar effort to speed up deportations without regard to pending applications for relief, Sessions
directed immigration judges to no longer use the tool of administrative closure to take a case off a judge’s docket while an application was pending before a different agency.264
More controversially, Sessions proposed individual production quotas on immigration judges, which would impact judges’
performance evaluations if a judge failed to comply.265 Under
this metric, immigration judges would be required to complete
700 cases a year, have a remand rate by the Board or circuit
court of under 15%, and meet at least half of a list of performance
benchmarks related to completing certain types of cases within
strict deadlines.266 According to a statement of the President of
the National Association of Immigration Judges before Congress
in April 2018, this “unprecedented move . . . violates every tenet
of an independent court and judges . . . .”267 With these changes,
262. Id.
263. See In re Hashmi, 24 I. & N. 785, 793–94 (A.G. 2009) (“Compliance with
an Immigration Judge’s case completion goals . . . is not a proper factor in deciding a continuance request, and Immigration Judges should not cite such
goals in decisions relating to continuances.”). The Immigration Judge in
Hashmi had denied a motion to continue to a noncitizen who had an application
pending before the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Id. at 786–87.
When the Board originally upheld that denial, the Third Circuit, on appeal, held
that the decision was “impermissibly arbitrary” because it relied on case completion goals, which the court stated “should not be read as an end in themselves
but as a means to prompt and fair dispositions, giving due regard to the unique
facts and circumstances of the case.” Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 261
(3d Cir. 2008).
264. In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Romero
v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019).
265. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, U.S. Attorney Gen., to
Adjudicative Employees, EOIR Performance Plan (Mar. 30, 2018), http://cdn
.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6ACV-DPVU]. This memorandum was sent to immigration judges on March
30, 2018. See Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 2, 2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html [https://perma.cc/
WHV6-9SRM].
266. See Sessions, supra note 265.
267. Statement, supra note 6, at 7; see also Betsy Woodruff, New Quotas for
Immigration Judges Are “Incredibly Concerning,” Critics Warn, DAILY BEAST
(Apr. 2, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-quotas-for
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Sessions fulfilled one of the Trump administration’s stated concerns of deterring illegal immigration to the U.S., since the DOJ
publicly stated that the backlog in immigration proceedings is
attributed to discretionary grants of removal, which “have
slowed down the adjudication . . . and incentivized further illegal
immigration . . . .”268
In 2008, concern over the political hiring of immigration
judges caused a Congressional committee to examine these
claims.269 DOJ former liaison to the White House, Monica Goodling, testified before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee that,
from 2004–2006 the DOJ and White House had appointed immigration judges based on their Republican Party affiliations or
conservative political views, bypassing the usual procedures.270
While these concerns righted themselves in response to this Congressional inquiry,271 the concerns appear to have reemerged in
the DOJ’s recent hiring of immigration judges to clear up the
714,000 case backlog.272 In this process, there have been allegations that candidates’ applications were either stalled or rejected
“based on their perceived political or ideological views.”273 The
-immigration-judges-are-a-recipe-for-disaster-critics-warn?ref=scroll [https://
perma.cc/6UUQ-LQS3] (“Critics of the move say it will result in speedier deportations of asylum-seekers, robbing them of due process.”).
268. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic
Caseload Reduction Plan (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press
-release/file/1016066/download [https://perma.cc/3HEA-F4A9].
269. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED
HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008) [hereinafter GOODLING POLITICIZED HIRING], https://oig
.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9J3-QXE7].
270. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at
1665–66 (citing GOODLING POLITICIZED HIRING, supra note 269, at 70–71).
271. See id. at 1666 (discussing the Attorney General’s 2007 new immigration judge appointment process in which EOIR would again play a dominant
role).
272. Tom Dart, Jeff Sessions Accused of Political Bias in Hiring Immigration
Judges, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2018, 6:59 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2018/jun/16/jeff-sessions-political-bias-hiring-immigration
-judges [https://perma.cc/BX4L-QCCY].
273. Id.; see also Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump Administration Blocked Her over Politics, CNN POLITICS (June 21, 2018, 10:40
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicant
-says-trump-administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html [https://
perma.cc/Q3ZV-QTZV]; Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication,
supra note 6, at 1689 (“The tawdry hiring practices that so badly tarnished
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renewed allegations of political bias in hiring immigration
judges has caused congressional Democrats to request more information from the DOJ.274
C. THE UNDERMINING OF IMMIGRATION JUDGE INDEPENDENCE
IN BOND DECISIONS
This Section illustrates two examples of how the immigration bond system does not ensure a fair and neutral hearing,
again undermining judges’ independence. Thus, even though immigration judges often make individualized decisions about
flight risk and dangerousness,275 potentially releasing an immigration detainee for the remainder of removal proceedings, that
decision can be unilaterally undone by a DHS prosecutor. As
background, it is important to note that INS officials had long
expressed disdain for immigration judges,276 viewing them “as
pushy intruders whose demands in the name of due process only
obstruct the Service mission.”277 Not long after the EOIR’s creation, the INS publicly expressed the desire to take bond decisions
away from EOIR adjudicators.278 The INS had become increasingly frustrated by judges reducing their bonds, and thus INS
General Counsel announced at a conference for immigration lawyers that he desired to eliminate all immigration judge and
EOIR and other components of the Department of Justice have since been corrected, but without congressional action, nothing prevents future Justice Departments and White House officials from lapsing.”).
274. See Letter from Elijah E. Cummings et al., Members of Cong., to Jeff
Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 17, 2018).
275. By statutes and regulation, the following detainees have no right to a
bond hearing: those removable for several types of crimes or terrorism; detainees who have arrived at a port of entry and have not been admitted; and detainees who already have been ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c),
1231(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2019).
276. The district directors of INS delivered testimony before the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which proposed an Article I immigration court in its 1981 report. Fuchs, supra note 6, at 438–43 . In the opinion
of a consultant to the Commission, the INS “view[ed] the present role of immigration judges negatively,” asserting that immigration judges made “simple”
hearings needlessly complex, and even referred to their robes as “the black
nightgowns they frequently wear when conducting hearings.” Levinson, supra
note 6, at 646 & n.17 (citing Memorandum, Assoc. of Immigration Dirs.’ Conference with Comm’r Castillo (Dec. 14, 1977)).
277. Roberts, supra note 6, at 8–9.
278. Janet Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 395 (1987).
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Board review of INS bond decisions.279 In a white paper to the
INS regarding its detention strategies in 1997, Peter Schuck
noted these disparities between INS and immigration judge
bonds, and recommended that the Deputy Attorney
“adopt . . . policies designed to better coordinate bonding decisions and to impose departmental priorities and policies on
EOIR as well as the INS.”280
A 2001 interim regulation expanded the DHS’s authority to
unilaterally override an immigration judge’s release order by filing a piece of paper indicating the intent to appeal such decision.281 First adopted in 1998, the “automatic stay” was created
as an override to an immigration judge’s release of a noncitizen
who was subject to laws that required either presumptive or
mandatory detention because they were deportable for certain
criminal convictions.282 Attorney General John Ashcroft expanded this authority in 2001 in an interim regulation, which he
passed quickly without comment in the wake of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.283 The INS trial attorney could invoke
this authority in any case where the INS in its original custody
determination set no bond or a minimum bond of $10,000.284 No
longer was the authority limited to those who, because of a criminal conviction, were deemed presumptively dangerous by the
agency.285 Thus the INS could essentially determine the outcome
of a bond hearing before an immigration judge by setting an initial bond of at least $10,000 or no bond, allowing its prosecutors
to later invoke the automatic stay and hold someone in detention
regardless of the IJ’s ruling.286
279. See id.
280. Schuck, supra note 99, at 683–84.
281. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c), .19(i)(2), (2019).
282. Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens and for
Custody Redeterminations, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441 (May 19, 1998) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 236). For a comprehensive review of the history of the mandatory detention statutes, see Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck, eds., 2005).
283. Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909 (Oct. 31, 2001)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
284. Id. at 54,910.
285. See Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens and
for Custody Redeterminations, 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,447.
286. See Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. C 05-01796 WHA, 2005 WL 1514122, at *1–
2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005) (holding that the regulation “impermissibly merges
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The final rule was issued in 2006 after a notice-and-comment period, in which modest changes were made to the final
rule, none of which addressed concerns over IJ independence.287
Responding to comments that the automatic stay undermined
the functions of adjudicator and prosecutor” and that it is “ultra vires” as it
“eliminates the discretionary authority of immigration judges to determine
whether an individual may be released, thereby exceeding the authority bestowed”); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Cole,
supra note 118, at 1031 (reasoning that the automatic stay “produces a patently
unfair situation by tak[ing] the stay decision out of the hands of the judges altogether and giv[ing] it to the prosecutor who has by definition failed to persuade a judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified”)). Some habeas courts found most problematic the creation of a new class of mandatory
detention by allowing such an override of the judge’s discretionary release decision. See, e.g., Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“The
regulation . . . has the effect of mandatory detention of a new class of aliens,
although Congress has specified that such individuals are not subject to mandatory detention.”); Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, No. CIV.A. 02-CV-2666, 2002
WL 1471555, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (describing the automatic stay as
“accomplishing Petitioner’s mandatory detention” by allowing the trial attorney
to override the judge’s release order). One court found the regulations to be unlawful because there was no time limitation on the length of detention pursuant
to the stay authority. See Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D.
Conn. 2003).
287. The final rule set a time limit on the duration of the automatic stay,
providing that it would expire in ninety days if the Board did not decide the
appeal of the bond decision. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg.
57,873, 57,874 (Oct. 2, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003.6(c), .19(i)(2)).
However, as Raha Jorjani has observed, the “‘90-day limit’ of the new regulations can be dangerously deceptive,” as DHS can then seek a discretionary stay
(a procedure that is less one-sided in that the detainee has had the opportunity
to argue in support of release), continuing detention for up to thirty days, and
the stay can remain in effect for an additional five and up to fifteen days should
DHS seek Attorney General review (plus tolling of the time limits should the
noncitizen need more time for briefing). Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s Order: The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89, 106–07 (2010). The final rule also requires that a supervisory DHS officer sign off on the automatic stay filing, and that DHS certify
that there is factual and legal support for its position. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 57,874; see also Jorjani, supra, at 104–05 (arguing
that the final rule did not adequately address early courts’ rulings, such as in
Zabadi, 2005 WL 1514122, at *2, and Zavala, 310 F. Supp. at 1078, because
“the regulations are tantamount to permitting DHS to adjudicate the identical
legal issue that it is prosecuting before an independent authority” because “the
regulations require only that DHS approve its own legal strategy”); id. at 106
(noting that in order for there to be factual and legal support, the regulation
permits DHS to rely on legal arguments that are contrary to binding precedent,
which “permits DHS to detain immigrants without bond by relying on principles
that have been previously rejected by courts”).
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the IJ’s independence, the EOIR characterizes immigration
judges and immigration prosecutors (who at that point were
housed within DHS) as all acting together, carrying out the Attorney General’s “broad authority” to detain and release a
noncitizen on bond pending a decision to deport.288 And, as a reminder of the history of comingled functions, the EOIR cited to
the Supreme Court’s holding in Marcello v. Bonds that permitted
the combination of adjudicative and investigative roles in the
former INS.289

288. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 57,877 (“Under
longstanding provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney
General has had broad detention authority . . . . Now, after enactment of the
HAS, the Secretary of Homeland Security exercises that discretion in carrying
out the detention and enforcement authority formerly administered by the INS,
and the Attorney General and his delegates (the Board and the immigration
judges) exercise that discretion in the review of the custody decisions initially
made by DHS.”); see also id. at 57,879 (“[T]he INA places no restrictions on the
Attorney General’s or the Secretary [of DHS]’s discretion to prescribe procedures for the adjudication of bond requests by aliens during removal proceedings, and agencies are generally afforded great latitude in organizing themselves internally and in developing procedures for carrying out their
responsibilities.”).
289. Id. at 57,880 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 301, 311 (1955)). Once
the final regulation went into effect, which set a time limit of ninety days on the
duration of detention under the automatic stay, many habeas courts were not
able to reach a decision on the legal challenge because the Board had already
exercised its discretionary stay authority. See, e.g., Altayar v. Lynch, No.
CV1602479PHXGMSJZB, 2016 WL 7383340, at *4–6 (D. Ariz. Nov. 23, 2016)
(holding that the automatic stay had converted to discretionary stay by the time
of decision, and discretionary stay authority did not violate due process because
of opportunity for each party to brief issues). Of those courts that reached the
issue, however, the views of the respective role of judges and prosecutors in bond
hearings differed from the views held by earlier courts. For example, a federal
district court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin critiqued other courts’ holdings that the automatic stay provision was unconstitutional, characterizing
such courts’ decisions as “based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between DHS, the IJs, and the BIA, and their respective roles in exercising the
authority of the Attorney General to make custody determinations in cases involving the removal of aliens.” Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1032
(E.D. Wis. 2007). On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the issue concerning the
constitutionality of the alien’s detention had become moot. Hussain v. Mukasey,
510 F.3d 739, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Altayar, 2016 WL 7383340, at *4
(reasoning in dicta that the automatic stay did not violate due process, and reasoning that “a stay of some length is afforded precisely because it allows the
Government an opportunity to appeal before a detainee might flee”).
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Scholars have critiqued the automatic stay as an attack on
immigration judges’ independence.290 Immigration Judge Dana
Leigh Marks describes the automatic stay regulation as “th[e]
improper ability by one party virtually to guarantee its desired
outcome in bond proceedings,” which is part of a larger “trend
favoring enforcement priorities.”291 As Judge Marks notes, “With
one party retaining such a great legal advantage, it is understandable that the public finds the current arrangement to be
mere window-dressing and doubts the impartiality of the Immigration Courts.”292
A second affront to immigration judges’ independence in
bond decisions is the statutory authority that DHS has to rearrest a noncitizen, even after a prior release by an immigration
judge, without justifying the rearrest to an immigration judge.293
The statute and implementing regulation do not, on their face,
require DHS to prove any changed circumstances prior to a rearrest.294 The breadth of the language suggests that as soon as a
noncitizen has won a bond hearing and been released, DHS may
detain that person for any reason whatsoever, thus undermining
the bond hearing before the supposedly neutral immigration
judge. What is more, DHS need not even go through the steps of
filing the automatic stay in the requisite time period, or seeking
a discretionary stay, or writing an appeal to the Board. The authority certainly rewards the DHS attorney who has missed a
deadline, either the one business-day deadline for the automatic

290. See Cole, supra note 118, at 1031 (“[T]he regulation takes the stay decision out of the hands of the judges altogether . . . .”); Jorjani, supra note 287,
at 100 (noting, for instance, that “a release order cannot be executed until the
BIA has made a final decision on the custody appeal, despite an individualized
determination by the Immigration Judge . . . .”).
291. Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority, supra note 6, at 12.
292. Id.
293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (2012) (“The Attorney General at any time may
revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.”).
294. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(9) (2019) (“When an alien who, having been arrested and taken into custody, has been released, such release may be revoked
at any time in the discretion of the district director, acting district director, deputy district director, assistant district director for investigations, assistant district director for detention and deportation, or officer in charge (except foreign),
in which event the alien may be taken into physical custody and detained. If
detained, unless a breach has occurred, any outstanding bond shall be revoked
and canceled.”).
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stay or the thirty-day deadline for a typical appeal,295 or who
does not feel like writing a brief to the Board arguing against the
IJ’s release decision.296
The earliest example of the rearrest authority appears to be
for those whose orders of deportation could not be effectuated
because, due to World War I, borders had shifted, rendering
many people stateless.297 The statute required their deportation
on the vessels that brought them.298 Recognizing that is was unrealistic to effectuate all deportations pursuant to the statute,
the implementing rules permitted release if “prompt deportation
cannot be accomplished because of war or other conditions.”299
Upon receiving permission from the immigration agency, a deportable noncitizen could be released and permitted to accept
self-supporting employment under conditions set forth in the
rules.300 The rules required employers to set out a scheme of
work for the detainee and to pay a portion of the wages to the
immigration service as security against absconding.301 The detainee could be taken back into custody if the work finished and
there was no more, if he violated conditions of release, misbehaved, or failed to obey the laws, whether federal or state.302 According to Daniel Wilshire, who has chronicled the history of
U.S. immigration detention,
They were subject to extraordinary controls and powers of re-arrest not
linked to the possibility of deportation or criminal charges. They were
“reauthorized” [having become “unauthorized” by virtue of their deportation orders], but remained virtually at the mercy of the executive in
ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to lawful residents or
citizens.303
295. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i).
296. Id.
297. DANIEL WILSHIRE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS
32 (2012).
298. The Immigration Act of 1917 stated that, “all aliens brought to this
country in violation of the law shall be immediately sent back . . . to the country
whence they respectively came, on the vessels bringing them, unless in the opinion of the Secretary of Labor immediate deportation is not practicable or
proper.” Id. at 32 (citing Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 18, 39
Stat. 874, 887–89 (repealed 1952)).
299. Id. (citing Immigration Laws (Act of February 9, 1917) – Rules of May
1, 1917, Rule 17A(1)).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing Rules 17A(2)–(3), (5)).
303. Id.
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The rearrest authority later appeared in the statute governing detention pending deportation proceedings, where the detainee’s right to be in the U.S. had not yet been extinguished.304
Since the earliest challenges, courts have found that such rearrest must pass review for abuse of discretion, suggesting that
immigration officials can only rearrest based on new evidence.305
Yet, Congress subsequently took away federal courts’ jurisdiction to review the exercise of discretion in bond decisions,306 leaving even that limitation on the rearrest authority open to abuse
without oversight by the judiciary. The Board also examined the
rearrest authority in the 1981 case Matter of Sugay.307 There the
original bond amount of $50,000 was reduced by the IJ to

304. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414,
§ 242(a), 66 Stat. 163, 209 (“But such bond or parole, whether heretofore or
hereafter authorized, may be resolved at any time by the Attorney General, in
his discretion, and the alien may be returned to custody under the warrant
which initiated the proceedings against him and detained until final determination of his deportability.”).
305. For example, in Carlson v. Landon, one of the noncitizens arrested for
deportation argued that his rearrest pursuant to the new Internal Security Act
of 1950, after his previous release under bond on the same warrant, with no
proof of changed circumstances, was an abuse of the Attorney General’s discretion. 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952). The Court held that “[a]lthough in a civil proceeding for deportation the same branch of government issues and executes the
warrant, we think the better practice is to require in those cases also a new
warrant.” Id. at 546. The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Carlson, permitted the rearrest of a noncitizen under the 1952 statutory authority to not be an abuse of
the Attorney General’s discretion when the noncitizen engaged in “continued
and undenied” communist activity in the period before he was retaken into custody. Ocon v. Landon, 218 F.2d 320, 326 (9th Cir. 1954). Similarly, the D.C.
Circuit prohibited a noncitizen’s rearrest unless there were “adequate reasons
for making the arrest”; the court reasoned that “[n]either appellant’s criminal
record nor his unpopularity justifies imprisoning him.” Rubinstein v. Brownell,
206 F.2d 449, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The Second Circuit interpreted the rearrest
authority and held, “[W]e cannot construe the statute to give the Attorney General unbridled license to exercise his discretion as to detention in whatever arbitrary or capricious way he might see fit, provided only that he act with reasonable dispatch to obtain a decision as to the alien’s deportability.” United
States ex rel. Yaris v. Esperdy, 202 F.2d 109, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1953).
306. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012).
307. Sugay, 17 I. & N. 637, 639 (BIA 1981) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(c)
(1980)) (“When an alien who, having been arrested and taken into custody, has
been released, such release may be revoked at any time in the discretion of the
district director . . . , in which event the alien may be taken into physical custody and detained.”).
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$20,000; after the noncitizen’s applications for relief were denied, the INS District Director elected to revoke the IJ’s $20,000
bond and set a $30,000 bond. Responding to a challenge that the
regulation “undermine[d] the impartial and independent decision of the immigration judge,”308 the Board responded that the
noncitizen always has recourse to appeal the new custody decision by INS to the immigration judge, and then to the Board.309
Also, the Board directed that “no change should be made by a
District Director absent a change of circumstances.”310
Although Matter of Sugay is a restraint on DHS’s otherwise
extremely broad authority to rearrest,311 it does not go far
enough to protect immigration judges’ independence in deciding
bond. There is no requirement that DHS must promptly prove
the changed circumstances to a judge; thus, a noncitizen could
suffer a significant amount of detention until the government
must justify the change in circumstances to override the prior
release order. Currently, a district court order protects the nation-wide class of unaccompanied minors who are rearrested by
mandating that DHS prove changed circumstances within seven
days of rearrest;312 however, there is no comparable case extending that requirement to immigration detainees who are over the
age of eighteen.313 What is more, the regulations governing bond
hearings require that if a detainee loses a bond hearing and then
308. Id. at 639.
309. Id. at 639–40.
310. Id. at 640. In the case, the Board found that there was a sufficient
change of circumstances, namely: (1) new evidence, which included a certified
conviction record for murder in the Philippines (at the first bond hearing, the
government had presented this fact, but their records were not certified or authenticated); and (2) that the noncitizen had been denied relief and ordered deported by the IJ. Id. at 638.
311. Id.
312. Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d, 1168, 1195–96 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(ordering government to prove changed circumstances for unaccompanied minors who were released from the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement
to sponsors and then later, upon DHS’ belief that the minors were gang-involved, were placed back into government custody based on a finding of dangerousness, without justifying such redetention to a judge), aff’d, 905 F.3d 1137
(9th Cir. 2018).
313. Anyone over the age of eighteen is subject to adult detention, governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) (unlike the detention of unaccompanied minors, which
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1232). See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat.
5044, 5074–82.
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seeks another bond hearing because of changed circumstances,
he must file a request in writing; this regulation also requires
that the detainee show a “material” change in circumstances.314
Advocates representing noncitizens in bond hearings might wonder why they do not have similar authority as DHS, allowing
them to unilaterally release their clients if they can prove to
themselves that there is a change in circumstances. Such a suggestion seems absurd, and yet it is just the flipside of the authority that DHS has to unilaterally overrule a supposedly “neutral”
immigration judge decision.
D. IMMIGRATION DETENTION AS “DIFFERENT” FROM OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the wake of the 2002 Homeland Security Act, Former INS
General Counsel David Martin defended the Attorney General’s
supervision of immigration adjudicators.315 He argued that immigration “may implicate particularly sensitive foreign policy
dealings or law enforcement decisions,” so that “immigration policy may have to adapt quickly in response to events. . . . For
these reasons, . . . all relevant decisions where law is interpreted
and policy set, including adjudications, should ultimately be under the authority of a Cabinet official, who has wider horizons
and more immediate political accountability than the usual independent tribunal.”316 From a management perspective, he hypothesizes a situation where a massive influx of migrants come
to the border; in this situation the Attorney General could deploy
not only enforcement officers but also immigration judges.317
Martin’s concern for foreign policy is an example of what Peter Schuck calls “classical immigration law,”318 which “sanctioned a system of adjudication in which the hierarchy of legitimate legal succession is completely reversed. Here, where
sovereignty confronts strangers, the Constitution can be subor-

314. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (2019).
315. David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Reauthorization Act: An Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, INSIGHT Apr.
2003, at 18.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Schuck, supra note 124, at 5–34.
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dinated to a congressional statute, indeed, to mere administrative practice.”319 Martin’s defense of the current immigration adjudication structure views immigration decisions as only implicating foreign policy concerns when, in fact, immigration
enforcement involves the lives of individual people who have individual rights under the Constitution, especially when the government takes away their physical liberty.320 Questions of physical liberty have historically been viewed by common law courts
as deserving of special concern, and separate from national security questions.321
Martin’s defense of the current structure also does not account for the ways in which courts have failed to treat questions
of physical liberty in the immigration context as run-of-the-mill
administrative law decisions, which normally would deserve deference under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.322 Alina Das and Michael Kagan both note various examples where courts have applied this “liberty” exception to Chevron deference, albeit without courts explicitly acknowledging the creation of such an
exception.323 The “physical liberty” exception is one of a growing
number of “immigration” exceptions to Chevron deference for
which scholars are advocating.324
319. Id. at 33–34.
320. See supra Part I.
321. See Daniel Wilsher, Whither the Presumption of Liberty? Constitutional
Law and Immigration Detention, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
ACADEMICS, ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-MAKERS 66, 72–78 (Michael J. Flynn & Matthew B. Flynn eds., 2017).
322. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
323. See Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and
Statutory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143,
154–58, 177–80, 188–99 (2015); Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception,
104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 533–35 (2019).
324. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Zone of Nondeference: Chevron and Deportation for a Crime, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 323, 330 (2017) (arguing that Chevron
deference should not apply when the statutory interpretation question involves
deportation for a criminal conviction); Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Immigration
Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 10, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-michael
-kagan/ [https://perma.cc/4PXC-8TW5]; Michael Kagan, Does Chevron Have an
Immigration Exception?, YALE J. ON REG: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 19, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/does-chevron-have-an-immigration-exception-by-michael
-kagan/ [https://perma.cc/454C-QSHU]; see also Bassina Farbenblum, Executive
Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond
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As this Part has explained, the immigration system has long
lacked a truly neutral judge; even when an immigration judge
decides to release a detainee during removal proceedings, that
judge does not exercise complete independence. The Trump administration has made every effort to undermine immigration
judges’ independence, leading some judges to retire in protest.325
The system thus regularly violates noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment rights because there is no neutral judge authorizing their
detention during removal proceedings.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this Article, I propose that a federal magistrate judge
promptly review all immigration arrests by ensuring that there
is probable cause to remove the person in order to continue pretrial detention. Parts I and II have outlined why immigration
detainees possess such rights and why immigration judge review
does not suffice to protect these important Fourth Amendment
rights. This Part considers several additional questions about
whether such a proposal is truly warranted, realistic, and sufficient to address the identified legal problems.
First, does the system already provide for Article III judge
review, in that a detainee can bring a habeas corpus petition in
federal district court?326 Vindicating the widespread Fourth
Amendment violations described in this Article through individual habeas corpus petitions is a near-impossible task. To begin,
it may be strategically unwise for an immigration detainee to
raise the immigration judge’s lack of neutrality before the federal court since the detainee risks offending the judge who may
later be deciding discretionary relief in immigration court. Also,
an individual habeas corpus petition is time-consuming, and de-

Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2011) (questioning the role of Chevron deference
in asylum cases, where legal standards are governed by international treaty
obligations).
325. See Aleaziz, supra note 34 (“The timing of my retirement was a direct
result of the draconian policies of the Administration, the relegation of [judges]
to the status of ‘action officers’ who deport as many people as possible as soon
as possible with only token due process . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting
former immigration judge John Richardson)).
326. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). In such situations, all parties can consent
to a magistrate conducting the proceeding, which is a civil proceeding. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

1332

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1275

tainees rarely have court-appointed counsel for such a legal battle.327 For those who are fortunate enough to have counsel in the
deportation case, that attorney may choose not to spend time litigating the habeas challenge when the client now faces an expedited hearing on the merits of the deportation case.328 Hours
spent preparing a habeas petition are frequently wasted, as federal district courts may not reach a decision on the merits of the
detention while the detainee is still fighting the deportation
case.329 An amicus curiae brief filed in a habeas appeal330 presented statistics from the District of Massachusetts that showed
an average of 130 days to resolve a habeas petition with some
averaging 408 days; this length of time operates to moot many
petitions.331

327. See Holper, supra note 15, at 969.
328. See id. at 965–69.
329. E.g., Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2007). For example, several habeas corpus cases challenging the automatic stay regulation have
been dismissed as moot, because the authority for the detention transferred before the habeas court could reach resolution of the issue. See supra Part II.C.
Some cases are dismissed because an appeal challenging the detainee’s custody
is still before the Board, which has jurisdiction to consider statutory challenges
and discretionary decisions regarding bond in an interlocutory appeal. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(f) (2019). Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is not statutorily required, habeas courts cite the doctrine of prudential exhaustion to dismiss habeas petitions where legal challenges to detention are before the Board.
See, e.g., Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 1:16-cv-11890-RGS (D. Mass.
Nov. 8, 2016). But see Figueroa v. McDonald, No. 18-10097-PBS, 2018 WL
2209217, at *3 (D. Mass. May 14, 2018) (holding that appeal to the BIA of improper burden allocation would be futile because the Board already had decided
the issue in a published case and that the Board does not have jurisdiction to
decide constitutional issues and therefore any constitutional claims need not be
exhausted).
330. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n in Support of
Appellant & Reversal, Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, No. 17-1918 (1st Cir.
Mar. 22, 2018). In a case challenging the unlawful burden allocation that a detainee must bear in his immigration bond hearing, the American Immigration
Lawyers Association submitted an amicus brief to encourage the court to reach
the burden allocation argument, id. at 15, even though the District Court had
not reached the issue because it decided the detainee was not prejudiced by the
burden allocation. Maldonado-Velasquez, No. 17-1918, at 1.
331. See Maldonado-Velasquez, No. 17-1918, at 1–2 (dismissing a detention
challenge because it became moot by virtue of the detainee receiving a final order of removal from the Board of Immigration Appeals).
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Challenging unlawful immigration detention practices
through class actions presents its own set of challenges.332 Although litigating on behalf of a class can address the mootness
concerns, Congress in 1996 sought to severely limit the use of
immigration class actions.333 When class action litigators presented convincing arguments to bypass such perceived bars to
class action litigation,334 the Supreme Court in 2018 asked the
lower court to decide whether a class was the best way to decide
a due process challenge to prolonged detention during deportation proceedings.335
Second, there is a practical concern that with the number of
immigration arrests increasingly growing (158,581 in fiscal year
2018),336 magistrate judges will not be able to keep up with the
demand. Magistrate judges’ time is already taken up by the prioritization of criminal cases, which must be given priority because of the time requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.337 Yet,
this is a question of funding for the judicial branch of government; should more magistrate judges be required, more funding

332. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 230, at 1631 (discussing court ruling barring class actions of patterns or practices of due process violations, which
“threaten[s] one of the most effective means noncitizens have to challenge illegalities in immigration law and procedures” (citing Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2007))).
333. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (1996) (“Regardless of the nature of the action or
the claim or the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court
(other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or
restrain the operation of [§§ 1221–31], other than with respect to the application
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such
part have been initiated.”).
334. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez reasoned that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) did not bar
class-wide relief because: (1) this statutory provision only barred temporary injunctions, not permanent injunctions or declaratory relief; and (2) “1252(f) prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention statutes, not injunction
of a violation of the statutes.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)).
335. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851–52 (2018).
336. U.S. IMMIGRATIONS & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVR4
-75PE].
337. See Peter G. McCabe, A Guide to the Federal Magistrate System, FED.
BAR ASS’N 43–45 (Aug. 2014), http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/A-Guide-to-the
-Federal-Magistrate-Judge-System [https://perma.cc/55HG-E7H4] (last updated Oct. 2016).
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can be appropriated for that purpose.338 Also, the concern of overburdening federal magistrates with authorizing needless detentions may be a reason for ICE to more carefully choose which
persons it chooses to detain for removal proceedings, instead of
assuming that all noncitizens are presumptively flight risks or
dangerous.339 Placing a “Fourth Amendment logjam” on ICE’s
detention machine does not, after all, interfere with ICE’s ability
to investigate and deport persons they believe to be in violation
of the immigration laws.340 To the extent that ICE believes a
“Fourth Amendment logjam” will cause many persons who have
“no right to be here” to be free within the United States, that
very question—whether someone has the right to be in the
United States—is precisely the question that should be determined by a neutral judge before extended pretrial detention can
occur.
Third, is magistrate judge review for probable cause sufficient, as they are not Article III judges? In the federal criminal
system, magistrate judges regularly review whether there is
probable cause to continue pretrial detention when police have
arrested someone without probable cause; they also regularly issue arrest warrants.341 Magistrate judges are assigned duties by
Article III district court judges; the jurisdiction they exercise is
that of the District Court itself, as they are not an administrative
agency or separate Article I court.342 Indeed, the Supreme Court
in Gerstein anticipated review for probable cause by a “neutral

338. See id. at 14 (noting the “slow but steady increase in the number of fulltime [magistrate judge] positions over the years” was “partly the result of increased district court caseloads, but due also to the increasing delegation of a
broad range of additional judicial duties by the district courts”). But see id. (discussing the perilous “financial state of the federal judiciary – resulting from
several years of inadequate appropriations and the damaging effects of Congressional sequesters”).
339. See Mark Noferi, Mandatory Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen
Presumption of Dangerousness, in IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 215, 227–32 (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2016).
340. See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 218 (1st Cir. 2015) (reasoning that ICE officials can go about their work determining whether someone
has violated the immigration laws; they must, however, let the person out of jail
while they undertake such investigation if they have not proven probable cause
to detain).
341. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 23, 26–27.
342. See id. at 2.
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and detached magistrate”343 to fulfill a criminal defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights.
Fourth, one could argue that questions of removability are
best left to the expert immigration judges, not federal magistrate
judges. Yet, a closer look reveals that federal magistrate judges
do in fact handle questions of removability. As prosecutions for
illegal entry and reentry have become increasingly more common,344 federal judges no doubt are familiar with immigration
law and what constitutes presence in violation of the law.345
Magistrate judges, although not trying cases of reentry, which is
a felony,346 regularly issue arrest warrants based on probable
cause347 that a person who has been ordered removed is found in
the U.S. or authorizing continued detention.348
Magistrate judges certainly have more expertise in what is
“probable cause,” because that term does not exist in the immigration statute and regulations. Although certain immigrationspecific terms like “reason to believe”349 have been interpreted to
be the rough equivalent of probable cause,350 it is not a typical
immigration term of art. In contrast, a federal magistrate who
reviews warrants would be very familiar with the concept of
probable cause.351
As for questions that arise from removability based on criminal convictions, it should be noted that the same analysis for
removability based on a criminal conviction applies when a federal court applies a variety of sentencing provisions that rely on
343. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1975).
344. Immigration Prosecutions for February 2018, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
bulletins/immigration/monthlyfeb18/fil/ [https://perma.cc/66QQ-ANDH].
345. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (prohibiting unlawful entry to the U.S.);
id. § 1326(a) (prohibiting unlawful reentry to the U.S. or be found in the U.S.
after having been deported, ordered removed, or denied admission).
346. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 59.
347. See id. at 23; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a), 5.
348. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
349. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (prohibiting an alien who is inadmissible
because the consular officer or the Attorney General has “reason to believe” is a
drug trafficker from obtaining a visa or eligibility to be admitted to the U.S.).
350. Alexa C. McDonnell, Reason To Believe: Satisfying the Standard of
Proof of Section 212(a)(2)(C)(i), IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, May–June 2011, at 6, 10,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2011/07/06/vol5no5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7LW-ACKR].
351. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 23.
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prior convictions for certain categories of offenses.352 Although
district courts, not magistrate judges, apply this analysis in felony sentencing,353 many magistrate judges later become district
court judges.354 Thus, magistrate judges could benefit from the
practice of applying the categorical approach when the issue to
be determined is whether there is probable cause that someone
is removable for a criminal conviction. Magistrate judges also
may assess the strength of a particular detainee’s arguments
against removal in the context of deciding an immigration habeas corpus petition.355
Fifth, there are proposals that could provide the requisite
neutrality of immigration adjudicators without involving federal
magistrate judges. For example, others have proposed an Article
I court, or an independent agency within the DOJ, staffed by Administrative Law Judges (ALJ).356 As other scholars have noted,

352. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for
the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of
Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 269 (2012).
353. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 29.
354. Id. at 16 (“[M]any magistrate judges have been rewarded by eventual
promotion to an Article III judgeship.”).
355. See, e.g., Muse v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-0054 (PJS/LIB), 2018 WL
4466052, at *3–6 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2018) (applying multi-factor test for
whether mandatory detention without bond hearing violates due process and,
as part of the test, assessing the likelihood that the removal proceedings will
result in a final order of removal); Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-CV-2446 (AJN), 2018
WL 2357266, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (applying multi-factor test for
whether mandatory detention without a bond hearing violates due process and,
as part of the test, assessing any arguments detainee has made against removal).
356. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Following the INA, congressional committees, scholars, the private bar, and immigration judges have
called for more independence in the immigration adjudication system. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text. In 1981, a Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy wrote a report with 100 recommendations for President
Reagan; one of the changes recommended was the creation of an Article I Immigration Court to “upgrade the entire process of adjudication in exclusion and
deportation cases.” Fuchs, supra note 6, at 438, 443. The National Association
of Immigration Judges also has called for Congress to create an Article I court,
citing the Tax Court as a successful example of impartial adjudication. See, e.g.,
Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority, supra note 6, at 15. Immigration scholar and
former Chief Counsel to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Stephen
Legomsky proposed the conversion of immigration judges into administrative
law judges (ALJs), and moving them from the Department of Justice to a new,
independent executive branch tribunal; he explained the contours of this system
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however, neither ALJ review nor the creation of Article I courts
has provided the anticipated decisional independence of the adjudicators.357 Also, an independent executive branch agency
would need to jockey for funds from Congress each year; this is
easier when their decisions involve politically popular causes

as well as its advantages and disadvantages in a 2010 article. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at 1710–14, 1721. The
American Bar Association (ABA) in 2010 completed a lengthy report on the immigration adjudication system, reviewing extensive literature on the topic and
interviewing scholars, judges, and practitioners. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note
6. The ABA considered three possible models: an Article I court, an independent
agency within the Executive Branch, and a hybrid model. Id. at 6–9. The ABA
recommended an Article I court as the preferred option among the three because
it would be a wholly judicial body, likely “to engender the greatest level of confidence in its results, [could] use its greater prestige to attract the best candidates for judgeships, and offers the best balance between independence and accountability to the political branches.” Id. at 6–35. As a second choice, the ABA
recommended the independent agency model, which “would be an enormous improvement over the current system and offers a strong alternative if the Article
I court is deemed infeasible or unacceptable to Congress and/or the President.”
Id. at 6–36.
357. E.g., Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 549–
50, 550 n.54 (2011); Taylor, supra note 246, at 485. Jill Family critiques the
Article I model for reforming the immigration system, citing the congressional
decision to create an independent Article I court for the adjudication of veterans’
benefits, which did not provide the anticipated panacea of decisional independence. Family, supra at 549–50. She also cites several law review articles that
critique the pro-government bias by the Tax Court, which is another example of
an agency created as an independent tribunal, to illustrate that creating an independent tribunal does not always create completely independent adjudicators. Id. at 550 n.54. Similarly, Margaret Taylor, recognizing the many calls for
an independent immigration agency, responded with the example of the social
security disability benefits system, which saw a similar transformation that did
not provide the full decisional independence hoped for by reformers. Taylor, supra note 246, at 485–90. She notes that “ALJ independence all but extinguishes
an agency’s authority over hiring, firing, and supervision of its ALJs, but gives
an agency control—according to whatever administrative appeal or quality assurance procedures the agency might establish—over ALJ decisions.” Id. at 485.
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like veterans’ benefits; a politically unpopular cause such as immigration adjudication would fare much worse.358 Further, in response to a recent Supreme Court ruling,359 a July 2018 Executive Order has changed the appointment process for ALJs, whose
appointment processes will now be controlled by agency heads
instead of the less political Office of Personnel Management.360
Critics have raised concerns that this will lead to more political
hiring of ALJs,361 reflecting the same concerns over political hiring for immigration judges.362 Thus, even ALJs are not completely free from the political process—not enough to ensure a
truly neutral judge for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Finally, despite years of scholars, judges, and congressional
committees calling for an overhaul to the immigration adjudication system,363 none has been forthcoming—if history is any
guide, these changes are unlikely to occur anytime soon. Magistrate judges, however, already exist and regularly decide
whether there is probable cause to detain. This proposal asks
that they step in to protect immigration detainees’ Fourth
Amendment rights.

358. Russell R. Wheeler, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and
the Promise of Third Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and
Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1854 (2010); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note
6, at 6–7 (“A new court or agency would face stiff competition for resources.
However, the budget for the immigration judiciary would not have to compete
for funding with other priorities within the same department, as it does now in
DOJ.”). Yet, as the ABA noted, “the main thrust of most criticisms or doubts
expressed about an independent court or agency seems to be that it will not
necessarily solve all of the current problems with the existing system. That,
however, does not diminish the case for attacking problems that can be addressed by creating an independent immigration judiciary.” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 6, at 6–7 (emphasis in original).
359. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding that administrative law
judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are “officers of the United
States” within the meaning of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause).
360. Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018).
361. Eric Yoder, Trump Moves To Shield Administrative Law Judge Decisions in Wake of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/07/10/trump-moves-to-shield
-administrative-law-judge-decisions-in-wake-of-high-court-ruling/ [https://
perma.cc/78F6-7UNP].
362. See Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 372–74.
363. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. immigration detention system lacks truly neutral
judges to authorize months or years of executive detention for
thousands of people each year. This is precisely the type of legal
wrong that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. As
the Court stated in Terry v. Ohio:364
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.365

Today, courts have breathed new life into Fourth Amendment
protections for immigration detainees through the ICE detainer
litigation. The next round of Fourth Amendment litigation in immigration law should resolve a problem that has concerned
scholars, Congressional committees, lawyers and judges for decades—the lack of a truly neutral judge.

364. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
365. Id. at 21.

